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Pervasive computing leads to an increased integration between the real world and the com-
putational world, and many applications in pervasive computing adapt to the user’s context,
such as the location of the user and relevant devices, the presence of other people, light or
sound conditions, or available network bandwidth, to meet a user’s continuously changing
requirements without taking explicit input from the users.
We consider a class of applications that wish to consider a user’s context when deciding
whether to authorize a user’s access to important physical or information resources. Such
a context-sensitive authorization scheme is necessary when a mobile user moves across
multiple administrative domains where they are not registered in advance. Also, users
interacting with their environment need a non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues
about their context may be useful input into authorization policies for these resources.
Existing systems for context-sensitive authorization take a logic-based approach, because
a logical language makes it possible to define a context model where a contextual fact
is expressed with a boolean predicate and to derive higher-level context information and
authorization decisions from contextual facts.
However, those existing context-sensitive authorization systems have a central server
that collects context information, and evaluates policies to make authorization decisions on
behalf of a resource owner. A centralized solution assumes that all resource owners trust
the server to make correct decisions, and all users trust the server not to disclose private
context information. In many realistic applications of pervasive computing, however, the
resources, users, and sources of context information are inherently distributed among many
organizations that do not necessarily trust each other. Resource owners may not trust the
integrity of context information produced by another domain, and context sensors may not
trust others with the confidentiality of data they provide about users.
In this thesis, we present a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive autho-
rization. Our system enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization query in a peer-to-
peer way, while preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of mutually untrusted
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principals running those hosts. We also develop a novel caching and revocation mecha-
nism to support context-sensitive policies that refer to information in dozens of different
administrative domains. Contributions of this thesis include the definition of fine-grained
security policies that specify trust relations among principals in terms of information confi-
dentiality and integrity, the design and implementation of a secure distributed proof system,
a proof for the correctness of our algorithm, and a performance evaluation showing that the
amortized performance of our system scales to dozens of servers in different domains.
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Pervasive computing, also called ubiquitous computing, leads to an increased integration
between the real world and the computational world [117]. Our daily environment will
be embedded with hundreds of thousands of devices, which have computation and com-
munication capabilities, and people can concentrate on their task by interacting with those
devices in such a smart environment, rather than working with general-purpose desktop
computers. The vision of pervasive computing has been increasingly feasible as a crucial
set of hardware components have been developed [116] over the last decade. There are
many hand-held and wearable devices commercially available, and those can (or could) in-
teract with each other through wireless networking technologies, such as IEEE 802.11b and
Bluetooth. The advent of sensor networks [94] will lead to environments with thousands
or millions of embedded sensors that can provide detailed context information.
Successful applications becomecontext-aware, able to automatically adapt to the chang-
ing conditions in which they execute. Context-aware applications use context information,
such as the location of the user and relevant devices, the presence of other people, light or
sound conditions, or available network bandwidth, to meet a user’s continuously changing
requirements without taking explicit input from the users. Therefore, a system in pervasive
1
computing needs to define rules or policies to specify how it dynamically adapts itself to
a changing user’s context. For example, Schilit [104] applies if-then rules to change the
behavior of their system to adapt to a user’s changing context.
Besides defining triggering actions, many systems [28, 49, 95, 104] in pervasive com-
puting apply a logic-based language to derive high-level context information from raw
sensor data. Many context-aware applications need high-level context information (e.g.,
a user’s attending a meeting) to grasp the user’s intent and provide services that meet his
requirements appropriately. A logic-based language is suitable for this purpose, because
we can use the same logic-based language to express both contextual facts that correspond
to raw sensor data and rules that derive higher-level context information. For example, sup-
pose that a location-tracking system keeps track of the location of Bob’s PDA and that loca-
tion is expressed aslocation(pda12 , sudikoff ), which means thatpda12 is in the sudikoff
building. Suppose also that the factowner(Bob, pda12 ) is known to the system. Then,
Bob’s location could be derived using the rulelocation(P, L)← owner(P, D), location(D, L),
which derives the location of a userP from the location of deviceD that belongs to user
P .
One promising application of the logic-based approach is a context-sensitive autho-
rization system [5, 32] that considers a requester’s context as well as his identity to make
a granting decision; the system derives the granting decision (true or false) with a set of
rules encoding policies and facts encoding context information. A context-sensitive au-
thorization scheme is necessary when mobile users move across multiple administrative
domains in which a different authority defines security policies, because those users are
not registered into systems in each domain in advance. Also, users interacting with their
environments need a non-intrusive way to access resources, and clues about their context
may be useful input into authorization policies for these resources.
For example, imagine a “smart meeting room” with many embedded devices. The
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current whiteboard may be replaced with a networked virtual whiteboard. The meeting
attendees may read or write to it using their PDAs or other small devices in this room via
a wireless network. Since it is not practical to restrict the networked access to the board
physically as we do today, we need a new mechanism to restrict access to such resources.
The current access-control mechanism, based on a static access-control list (ACL), does
not work for this purpose, because it is impossible to modify the ACL for each meeting.
One reasonable policy, corresponding to one for a physical whiteboard, may be to allow
people in the meeting room to access the board only during the time slot specified in the
meeting calendar file. Thus, the authorization policy is location and time dependent, i.e., if
the principalP is in the room during the meeting time,P is granted to access the virtual
whiteboard. There are many other devices in the meeting room, such as the air conditioner,
projector, and light-level controller, which may be managed with similar context-sensitive
policies.
We can use context-sensitive policies to handle exceptional situations. Consider a
health-care application, in which policy dictates that medical records may be accessed only
by a patient’s primary physician. A different doctor in the emergency room, however, needs
to access the patient’s medical record if the condition of that patient is critical. In this case,
we may specify the context-sensitive authorization policy using the location of the patient,
a list of nearby doctors defined by some notion of proximity, and current medical sensor
data about the patient such as heart rate and blood pressure.
Finally, context-sensitive policies are useful for an emergency-response system [58,
100] that contains an information dissemination infrastructure for responders in a disas-
trous incident. The system collects information on disaster status and casualties in an inci-
dent from biomedical and environmental sensors and provides that information to the first
responders and the command centers. The first responders are responsible for rescuing and
evacuating casualties, and they obtain information on the situation of the incident and med-
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ical conditions of the casualties in that incident with their wireless portable or wearable
devices. However, access to the information on the incident must be limited on a need-
to-know basis to prevent an attack by an adversary who exploits the information on the
incident. Since the responders need to access information or resources managed by differ-
ent state or local agencies, we adopt context-sensitive authorization policies that consider a
responder’s location, or severity of casualties near that responder, to grant access to critical
information (such as the location of other responders or status of various equipment) or to
a resource (such as a vehicle or other rescue equipment). In summary, context-sensitive au-
thorization allows users to define a flexible policy by referring to environmental variables,
attributes of objects and users, and both static and dynamic relationships between objects
and between users.
1.1 Research challenges
When we apply context-sensitive policies to systems for pervasive computing, we must ad-
dress the issue of information sharing among different organizations, because each sensing
system that keeps track of a user’s context information is owned by a different organization.
Most organizations possess a certain physical boundary inside which they themselves can
exclusively deploy sensing systems into their facilities. Therefore, a context-aware appli-
cation that keeps track of a mobile user that crosses the organizational boundaries needs
to obtain context information from multiple organizations to keep track of the user’s con-
text continuously. For example, imagine a large office building where there are sensors
managed by the city, the building owner, the companies leasing space, and the individual
employees. A location-aware application in that building might need to access multiple
indoor location tracking systems in different organizations. Furthermore, there are many
situations where sensing systems in the same area are managed by different organizations.
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For example, the facility department of a company, which manages an office environment,
controls the condition of light and temperature in the building, while the computer service
department keeps track of the location of users that carry a wireless device.
However, existing context-sensitive authorization systems [5, 8, 24, 32, 57, 88, 112]
have a central server that collects context information, and evaluates policies to make au-
thorization decisions on behalf of a resource owner. A centralized solution assumes that all
resource owners trust the server to make correct decisions, and all users trust the server not
to disclose private context information. Without such a universally trusted principal, it is
impossible to build a system that maintains the global knowledge of all the context informa-
tion. Cross-domain authentication [15, 25, 43] supports user authentication across multiple
administrative domains. However, it is not address the issue of assigning privileges for
accessing local resources to foreign users.
To achieve such information sharing among organizations, we must address two trust
issues. First, each administrative domain (organization) defines confidentiality policies to
protect information in that domain. It is necessary for an administrator of a location track-
ing system to protect users’ location privacy [13, 88], for example. Another example is a
server that maintains patients’ medical records. The server must respect HIPAA rules about
the confidentiality of medical records [1]. Therefore, a requester must satisfy the confiden-
tiality policies of an information provider to access the requested information. Second,
each administrative domain defines integrity policies that specify whether to trust informa-
tion from other domains in terms of the integrity (correctness) of that information. Because
context information is computed from raw sensor data, it inherently involves uncertainty. It
is, therefore, important for each domain to choose reliable sources of information to derive
correct context information.
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1.2 Secure distributed proof system
In this thesis, we propose a secure distributed proof system that makes an authorization
decision based on context-sensitive policies, addressing the issue of information sharing
among multiple administrative domains. We take a logic-based approach for an authoriza-
tion system [60, 124, 125]. When a client requests access to a resource, the resource owner
constructs a logical proof that derives a granting decision. If such a proof is successfully
constructed, access may be granted; otherwise access is denied.
To define the problem of information sharing precisely, we make a few assumptions.
First, context information and rules that express authorization polices are distributed across
servers in different administrative domains. There are other rules that derive higher-level
context information. Second, an administrator of each domain defines confidentiality poli-
cies to protect context information and rules in that domain. Third, an administrator of each
domain defines integrity policies that express the administrator’s trust in the correctness of
rules and facts in other domains. Although a method for obtaining accurate or trustwor-
thy context information [51] is an important research agenda in pervasive computing, we
assume that each administrator knows which information in other domains are trusted in
terms of its integrity and is thus able to define integrity policies properly. When an adminis-
trator trusts the integrity of information in other domains, that means that the administrators
agree on the semantics of the logical expression of that information. Therefore, our thesis
does not address the issue of how to agree on the semantics of information among multiple
parties. Furthermore, trust relationships in terms of confidentiality and integrity are defined
by principals, each of which represents a specific user or organization, and we assume that
each host is associated with one principal (e.g., the owner of a PDA, or the manager of a
server). In practice, one principal may manage multiple devices, but for generality here we
assume one principal per device.
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Figure 1.1: Decentralized evaluation of an authorization query. The proof of a query is
decomposed into sub-proofs and produced on distributed multiple hosts. On the left, Host
A generates a whole proof on a centralized server. On the right, Host A, B, and C produce
only a subtree of the proof.
Our major research goal is to build a distributed proof system that obtains an autho-
rization decision by collaborating multiple mutually untrusted principals in a peer-to-peer
way; that is, if a principal that handles an authorization query does not have all of the
necessary information, the principal could send subsequent queries to other principals, and
those principals handle those queries in the same way. The core of our approach is a proof
decomposition in a distributed environment according to each principal’s integrity policies;
that is, rather than depending on a central trusted server (Figure1.1a), we decompose a
proof into sub-proofs produced by multiple hosts (Figure1.1b). This collaboration is only
possible if the querier can trust the integrity of other hosts (to provide correct facts and to
properly evaluate rules) and if the other hosts can trust the querier with confidential facts.
In this thesis, we show that our secure distributed proof system meets three key goals
by presenting our algorithm, the design of the system, and the results of our experiments
that measure the performance of our system. These goals are:
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Confidentiality: Information used for making an authorization decision is protected ac-
cording to confidentiality policies defined by the owner of that information.
Integrity: Each principal receives a proof that satisfies his integrity policies from a prin-
cipal that handles the query.
Scalability: Our target application could involves dozens of principals in different do-
mains, and our system, therefore, should work with that many principals with rea-
sonable performance.
1.3 Contributions
We summarize the contributions of this dissertation below.
• We introduce fine-grained security policies to formally define trust relations among
principals in terms of information confidentiality and integrity.
• We show that it is possible to derive an authorization decision, even though autho-
rization rules and context information referred to by those rules are distributed across
multiple domains and are protected with different confidentiality policies. We de-
velop a distributed algorithm that enables multiple principals to construct a proof
in a peer-to-peer way, while preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of
those principals. We also prove the correctness of our algorithm.
• We design and implement a system that supports the distributed algorithm to study
the performance of the system. We also develop a caching and revocation mechanism
based on capabilities. Our revocation mechanism revokes all the cached information
that depends on an initially revoked fact across the servers.
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• We measure the performance of our system and show that the amortized performance
of our system scales to a large proof that spans across dozens of servers. Our system
is, therefore, suitable to a context-aware application in which a user’s privileges must
be continuously monitored. The results of our experiments with a wide range of
parameters should serve as guidelines about the worst-case performance of a systems
that adopts our techniques.
1.4 Dissertation outline
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
Chapter2 introduces our authorization rule language and also defines integrity and
confidentiality policies that formally define trust relations between principals.
Chapter3 describes the design of a secure distributed proof system for a simple case
in which confidentiality and integrity policies are defined only on facts. We introduce key
ideas that enables secure distributed proving.
Chapter4 extends the design of the system in Chapter3 for a general case in which
policies are defined on rules as well. We provide a proof for the correctness of the algo-
rithm.
Chapter5 describes the design of our caching and revocation mechanism based on
capabilities.
Chapter6 presents our experimental results that demonstrate the effectiveness of our
caching mechanism.
Chapter7 compares our system with related work in rule-based authorization, context-
sensitive authorization, and distributed proof systems.





In this section, we describe our language for defining authorization policies that protect
resources and introduce the concept of a proof tree, which is constructed when making
an authorization decision. Next, we introduceonfidentiality policiesthat protect both
authorization policies and context information andi tegrity policiesthat specify trust in
the correctness of those information. We also extend the notion of integrity to a proof tree.
2.1 Authorization rule language
In rule-based authorization systems, authorization policies are represented as logical ex-
pressions. We express authorization policies with Horn clauses since they are expressive
enough to support policies in existing rule-based authorization systems [5, 8, 32]. We do
not use a general first-order logic, which is not decidable in general. The syntax of a Horn
clause isb ← a1 ∧ a2 . . . ∧ an , which says that simple statements calledatomsa1 through
an, if all true, implyb. The atomb is called theheadof the clause, and the atomsa1, . . . , an
thebodyof the clause. An atom is formed from a predicate symbol followed by a paren-
thesized list of variables and constants. Our authorization policies do not support negation
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of atoms because it is impossible to collect complete information in a distributed environ-
ment. Also, we do not support atoms that take general functions as parameters. When there
is no atoms in the body of a Horn clause, the atom in the body of the clause represents a
fact, which is true without any conditions. For example, we can express the contextual fact
“Bob is in Hanover” aslocation(Bob, Hanover). We assume that each principal stores its
authorization policies and facts in a knowledge base. We express both contextual and static
facts in the same way. The difference is that contextual facts in the knowledge base are
updated dynamically.
Example authorization rules. The teams responding to a large-scale disaster are coordi-
nated by experts drawn from multiple disciplines (fire, police, medical) and often multiple
jurisdictions (city, state, federal). Increasingly, incident commanders use software to assist
with incident management and situational awareness. The National Incident Management
System (NIMS) [58] defines clear roles for the many participants in a large-scale response,
so role-based access control (RBAC) [103] is a natural basis for protecting resources in an
incident management system (IMS). Such an IMS needs to dynamically link people, re-
sources, and information from multiple domains, providing information to those who need
it in a time of crisis.
We give an example scenario1 in which roles in such an incident management system
is defined based on contextual situation of responders. Suppose that an incident occurs in
an airport. There is a surveillance camera image server managed by the airport, and the
chief of operations (bob) wishes to use the camera images to improve his awareness of the
situation. Figure2.1 shows a set of rules that define the airport’s policy to grant access
to the camera resource, which allows the local police chief access to the images whenever
he is in the airport, as determined by either his Wi-Fi network connection or by the GPS
1Note that this is not an official scenario defined by NIMS.
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tracking device in his radio. Rule 1 says that principalP must hold the roleoperationchief
to be granted, and rule 2 defines the two conditions to hold that role. The first condition
specifies the prerequisite rolepolice chief in a police department, and the second requires
principalP to be in the airport. Rules 3–5 specify how we derive the location of principal
P from the raw location information of a device.
2.2 Proof tree
To make an authorization decision, we must check whether a proof tree for query?grant(P )
can be constructed with a given set of rules and facts. The proof tree consists of nodes that
represent rules (or facts) and edges that represent the unification that replaces an atom in
the body of a rule in a parent node with the atoms in the body of a rule or a fact in a child
node. Every leaf node contains a fact that has no atom in its body.
Given the facts listed in Figure2.1, we can construct the proof tree shown in Figure2.2
by unifying the query with the first four rules, substituting variables as needed. We return to
this example in Sections3.6and4.7to explain how we construct this proof in a distributed
fashion.
2.3 Rule patterns
We first introduce the notion ofrule patterns, which are mechanisms for expressing confi-
dentiality and integrity policies on rules and facts in a knowledge base. A rule pattern is just
a regular Horn clause to be unified with a rule or a fact in the knowledge base. We use a rule
pattern to specify to which rules and facts a given policy is applied, because it is infeasible
to specify a policy on each instance of a rule or a fact that contains variables. A rule pattern
is associated with a set of rules or facts that match it throughunification, a pattern-matching
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Rules:
grant(P ) ← role(P, operationchief) (2.1)
role(P, operationchief) ← roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport) (2.2)
location(P,L) ← owner(P,D) ∧ location(D,L) (2.3)
location(D,L) ← wifi(D,A) ∧ in(A,L) (2.4)
location(D,L) ← gps(D,X, Y ) ∧ closeTo(X, Y, L) (2.5)
Facts:
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept). Bob is chief of the local police department. (2.6)
owner(bob, pda15). Bob owns device pda15. (2.7)
wifi(pda15, ap39). pda15 is associated with access point ap39. (2.8)
in(ap39, airport). Access point ap39 is at the airport. (2.9)




grant(bob)← role(bob, operation chief)
role(bob, operation chief)← roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(bob, airport)
location(bob, airport)← owner(bob, pda15) ∧ location(pda15, airport)
location(pda15, airport)← wifi(pda15, ap39) ∧ in(ap39, airport)
location(D,L)← gps(D,X, Y ) ∧ closeTo(X,Y, L)
roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept)
owner(bob, pda15)
wifi(pda15, ap39) in(ap39, airport)
Figure 2.2: Example proof tree based on the rules in Figure2.1.
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process that makes a rule pattern and an actual rule in the knowledge base identical by in-
stantiating variables in the rule pattern. For example, the rule patternlocation(bob, X) is
matched with the factlocation(bob, hanover) in the knowledge base, because the variable
X can be instantiated tohanover . It does not match with the factlocation(alice, hanover),
however. The rule patternrole(X, Y ) ← occupation(X,Y ) ∧ location(X, hospital) can
be matched with the rule below by instantiatingX to P andY to physician.
role(P, physician)← occupation(P, physician) ∧ location(P, hospital)
A principal may define as many security policies as it sees fit to define. Each security policy
(rp, t) is represented as a rule patternrp and a set of trusted principalst. There are two
kinds of security policies: integrity policies and confidentiality policies.
2.4 Integrity policies
Integrity policies express trust in the correctness of rules and facts. Our definition is based
on information flow theory [14, 134], which focuses on confidence in the accuracy of in-
formation rather than modification of information. When a principalpi defines the integrity
policy (rp, t) it means thatpi trusts those principals int, a set that we denoterust i(rp), to
be correct in whatever rules or facts match patternrp. We use subscripti in the trust policy
to denote which principal defines the policy.
The integrity of a fact means that the boolean value representing a fact is correct. For
example, if principalp0 includes principalp1 in its trust0(loc(P, X)), then principalp0
believes thatp1’s evaluation (true or false) of a location query of the form?loc(P, X) (e.g.,
?loc(bob, hanover)) is correct. On the other hand, the integrity of a rule means that the rule
itself is able to correctly derive a new fact. For example, if principalp0 includes principal
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p1 in its rule patterntrust0(loc(P, X) ← WiFi(P, Y ) ∧ in(Y, X)), thenp0 believes that
p1’s rule loc(bob, X) ← WiFi(bob, Y ) ∧ in(Y,X) is a correct rule to resolve the query of
the form?loc(bob, hanover). In other words, principalp0 believes that it is valid to replace
the queryloc(bob, hanover) with two sub-queries?WiFi(bob, Y ) and ?in(Y, hanover).
Principalp0 can verify that principalp1 applied the rule correctly to derive the conclusion
by checking the integrity of a proof tree defined in Section2.4.1.
Notice that trust on a fact is a stronger notion than trust on a rule. Trust on a fact
implicitly trusts the rules used to derive that fact. For example, the trust on the rule pattern
loc(X, Y ) implicitly indicates trust of any rule whose head can be unified withloc(X,Y ).
2.4.1 Integrity of a proof tree
A principal trusts the integrity of a proof tree (that is, believes its result) for a query if it
is consistent with its integrity policies. We formally define the integrity of a proof tree
from the viewpoint of an initial querier principalp0 inductively as follows. Suppose that
principalp0 issues a queryq to principalp1.
Base case (single-node tree):If the proof from principalp1 contains a queryq’s result,
and principalp0 has an integrity policy(rp, t) such that rule patternrp matches query
q andp1 belongs to the set of principalst, thenp0 trusts the results of the proof tree.
Induction step: If the proof fromp1 contains a proof tree whose root node represents a
rule r, the head of ruler matches queryq, p0 has an integrity policy(rp, t) such that
rule patternrp matchesr andp1 belongs to the set of principalst, andp0 trusts the




Confidentiality policies protect facts and rules in a principal’s knowledge base. A fact must
be protected if it contains confidential information. A rule must be protected if confidential
information may be inferred from reading the rule. For example, the rulegrant(P ) ←
loc(bob, sudikoff ) says that any principalP is granted access whenbob is at the location
of sudikoffbuilding. If a request is granted, the requester may infer that bob is at Sudikoff,
which might not be public knowledge.
When a principalpi defines the confidentiality policy(rp, t), it means thatpi trusts
those principals int, which we often refer to as the access control listacli(rp), with facts
or rules matching rule patternrp. Principal p0 only responds to a queryq from prin-
cipal p1 if there exists a rule patternrp that can be unified with the queryq and prin-
cipal p1 belongs toacl0(rp). For example, suppose that principalp0 defines the policy
acl0(location(bob, L)) = {p1, p2}; principalp0 responds to a query?location(bob, hanover)
from principalp1, because rule patternlocation(bob, L) matches withlocation(bob, hanover).
2.6 Assumptions
In this thesis, we make a few assumptions to maintain our focus on the confidentiality and
integrity issues in a distributed context-sensitive authorization system. First, integrity poli-
cies of every principal are public knowledge. Second, each principal can gain knowledge
about whether it has a privilege of accessing information on a given fact from other princi-
pals. It is possible for a principal to infer that knowledge by issuing a query about that fact
to those principals. If the requesting principal receives a query result, that principal pos-
sesses the privilege. If the request is denied, that means that the principal does not possess
the privilege. However, the denial of a query request does not reveal any information on
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whether the principal that receives the query actually has knowledge about the fact in the
query or not. Third, we assume that each principal’s confidentiality policies on rules are
not public knowledge because a confidentiality policy on a rule discloses the fact that the
principal possesses a rule that matches the rule pattern of that confidentiality policy. Third,
a public-key infrastructure is available and every principal can obtain the public key of
other participants, so that they can establish secure channels with a session key and verify
the authenticity of messages with digital signatures.
For purposes of simplifying our explanation, we consider the basic case that supports
security policies only on facts first in Chapter3, and then the general case that supports
security policies on facts and rules in Chapter4.
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Chapter 3
Secure distributed proof system for the
basic case
In this chapter, we describe our secure distributed proof system for the basic case that
supports security policies only on facts. We first describe the architecture of the system
and introduce the notion of proof decomposition in a distributed environment. We then
cover a mechanism for enforcing confidentiality policies and give a distributed algorithm
for evaluating a logical query in a peer-to-peer way.
3.1 Architecture
With no central server to make authorization decisions, we use multiple hosts that are ad-
ministered by different principals. Without loss of generality, we assume that each hosti
is administered by a different principalpi, although in many realistic environments there
may be principals that own or manage many hosts. Each host stores a local copy of its prin-
cipal’s integrity and confidentiality policies. Each host provides an interface for handling














Figure 3.1: The hosts enclosed in the dotted lines make an authorization decision in a
collaborative way.
Figure3.1, a user sends a request to the server that provides some service, and the server
issues an authorization query to a host it chooses in order to make a granting decision. If
the host that receives the query does not have all the rules and facts for making the decision,
it issues subsequent queries to other hosts, and this process could be iterated recursively.
There is no single host that manages other hosts, and multiple hosts instead handle a query
in a peer-to-peer way.
All the hosts have an identical structure, which is shown in Figure3.2. The query
handler handles queries from other hosts and enforces the local confidentiality policies.
The inference engine constructs a proof tree for a given query based on the rules and facts
in the local knowledge base. If some query cannot be evaluated locally, the inference
engine issues a remote query to another host through the query issuer. The inference engine
is created per query by the query handler; multiple queries are handled concurrently by
multiple threads of the inference engine objects. The query issuer refers to its local integrity
policies to choose a principal whose evaluation of the query is trusted; the integrity policies
serve as a directory service to choose a principal to which it sends a query. The query issuer


















Figure 3.2: Structure of a host.
converts events that contain new context information into corresponding facts and updates
the knowledge base; these events may be delivered by a context-dissemination service such
as Solar [27].
3.2 Proof object
The response to a query is aproof object represented as(pr, n, (value)Kr), wherepr is
a receiver principal. Figure3.3 shows the grammar of a proof object. The proof object
contains a noncen that is attached with the query to prevent replay attacks by an adversary
that is capable of intercepting the encrypted messages between principals. In the following
discussion, we omit the nonce field in the proof object for brevity.
The value is a query result, which is a boolean value (TRUEor FALSE), a conjunc-
tion of boolean values, or the valueREJECT. The valueREJECTis used when a given
query is not handled because the querier principal does not satisfy the handler principal’s
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< proof >︸ ︷︷ ︸ ::= ‘(’ < receiver > ‘ , ’ < nonce > ‘ , ’ < proofs > ‘)’
< proofs > ::= ‘(’ < value pair > (∧ < value pair >) ∗ ‘)’ | ‘(’ < value > ‘)’
< value pair > ::= ‘(’ < receiver > ‘ , ’ < value > ‘)’
< receiver > ::= < string >
< query > ::= < atom >
< atom > ::= < predicate > ‘(’ < args > ‘)’
< predicate > ::= < string >
< args > ::= < arg > (‘ , ’ < arg >) ∗
< arg > ::= < string >
< value > ::= ‘TRUE ’ | ‘FALSE ’ | ‘REJECT ’
< nonce > ::= < number >
< number > ::= < number >< digit > | < digit >
< digit > ::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
Figure 3.3: Representation of a proof for the base case. The itemvalue, shown with
bold fonts, is encrypted with a public key of a principal that receives the proof. The item
proof, shown with an underbrace, is digitally signed with a private key of a principal that
constructs a proof.
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confidentiality policies. Otherwise, the handler principal constructs a proof tree locally,
then includes the query’s result (TRUEor FALSE) in the proof object. (We name the re-
turned object aproof objectbecause, in the general case in Section4, it contains a proof
tree that shows how the query result is derived.) The receiver principalpr might not be
the principal that issues queryq (we explain why, below), and, therefore, the name of the
receiver principal needs to be included in the proof object, so that the receiver principal can
decrypt an encrypted value. As indicated with the notation(value)Kr , the value must be
encrypted with receiver principalpr’s public keyKr to enforce the confidentiality policies
of the publisher principal. The public key encryption is performed to prevent intermediate
principals from reading the value. Furthermore, the whole proof object is transmitted via a
secure channel established with a session key between a querier and a handler principal to
prevent an eavesdropper from reading the content of the proof object. We assume that the
two principals share the symmetric key via a protocol using public-key operations when
the querier and handler principal authenticate with each other for the first time. The digital
signature of a whole proof signed by a handler principal ensuresnon-repudiabilityof the
handler; that is, the handler principal is not able to falsely deny later that it sent the proof.
A principalp0 that handles queryq0 might issue subqueries to other principals, and the
returned proofs from those principals might contain encrypted query results that principal
p0 cannot decrypt. Therefore, the queryq0’s result depends on the encrypted values in
the proofs for the subqueries thatp0 issues, and principalp0 returns a proof for queryq0
that contains the query results for the subqueries as follows. Suppose that principalp0
issues subqueriesqi for i = 0, . . . , n − 1, and receives severalpf i = (pr(i), (value i)Kr(i))
wherepr(i) is the receiver principal of the proof,value i is the queryqi’s result, andKr(i) is
principalpr(i)’s public key. The queryq0’s result isTRUEonly if p0 can verify thatvalue i
is TRUE for all i in the proof. If anypf i that principalp0 can decrypt contains aFALSE
value,p0 returns a simple proof(pr, (FALSE )Kr), wherepr is a receiver principal chosen
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by p0. Otherwise, if there are some subproofs thatp0 cannot decrypt (becauser(i) 6= 0),
then principalp0 returns the proof(pr, (∧i(pr(i), (value i)Kr(i)))Kr) for all r(i) 6= 0, as a
response to queryq0. We do not need to include the digital signatures of the embedded
subproofs in the proof, because a digital signature is only used to ensureon-r pudiability
of the principal that sends the whole proof. In Section4.1, a digital signature is also used to
check the authenticity of a subproof in a whole proof. The proof contains the concatenated
subproofs encrypted with public keyKr. The query result of the proof isTRUE if the
conjunction of all thevalue i (i.e.,∧i(value i)) is TRUE.
3.3 Decomposition of a proof tree
When a querier issues a query to a principal that satisfies the querier’s integrity policies for
that query, the principal that handles the query only returns a proof that contains the query’s
result (TRUE, FALSE, or REJECT), and the proof tree that derives the query’s result does
not have to be disclosed to the querier. If multiple principals are involved in processing
a query, no single principal obtains all the rules and facts in the proof tree of the original
query. Instead, the proof tree for the query is decomposed into multiplesubtreesevaluated
by different principals in a distributed environment. In other words, there is no single
principal that maintains a whole proof; instead, each principal maintains a subproof of the
whole proof.
Figure3.4 describes such collaboration between a querier and a handler hosts. Sup-
pose that hostA run by principal Alice, who owns a projector, receives an authorization
query?grant(Dave, projector) that asks whether Dave is granted access to that projector.
Since Alice’s authorization policy in her knowledge base refers to a requester’s location
(i.e., location(P, room112 )), Alice issues a query?location(Dave, room112 ) to hostB











grant(P, projector):- location(P, room112)
location(P,L):- owner(P,D), location(D,L)
trust(location(P,L)) = {Bob} acl(location(P,L)) = {Alice}
location(pda15, room112)
owner(Dave, pda15)
?grant(Dave, projector) ?location(Dave, room112)
TRUE
Figure 3.4: Remote query between two principals. Alice is a principal that owns a projector,
and Bob is a principal who runs a location server. We only show a query result in Bob’s
reply, omitting other fields.
that matches a rule patternlocation(P, L) as defined in her integrity policies. Bob pro-
cesses the query from Alice, because Alice similarly satisfies Bob’s confidentiality poli-
cies for queries that matches a rule patternlocation(P, L). Bob derives that Dave is in
room112from the location of his device using the factslocation(pda15 , room112 ) and
owner(Bob, pda15 ). However, he only needs to return a query resultTRUE that states
that location(Dave, room112 ) is true, because Alice believes Bob’s statement about peo-
ple’s location (i.e.,location(P, L)) according to her integrity policies1.
The proof of the query is thus decomposed into two subproofs maintained by Alice and
Bob respectively. Alice’s proof contains only a root node that stateslocation(Dave, room112 )
is true, and Dave’s proof consists of a root node that contains the rule and two leaf nodes
that containowner(Dave, pda15 ) andlocation(pda15 , room112 ). In general, Bob could
return a proof tree that contains multiple nodes. If Alice only trusts Bob’s rule that derives
Bob’s location instead of Bob’s fact, he would need to submit a larger proof tree to satisfy
Alice’s integrity policies as we discuss in Chapter4.
1In the real world, Dave might lose his device or leave it in his office momentarily, and, as a result, Bob
incorrectly reports Dave’s location to Alice. However, Alice is responsible for deciding whether she should


















Figure 3.5: Decomposed proof tree. Principalsp0,p1,andp2 construct a proof tree for query
q0 in a distributed way. Nodesn0 andn1 are leaf nodes of proof treesT0 andT1 respectively.
Principalp0 that handles queryq0 issues queryq1 to principalp1 to obtain the fact in node
n0, and principalp1 similarly issues queryq2 to principalp2.
In general, a proof could be decomposed into sub-proofs maintained by multiple princi-
pals. Figure3.5shows that the proof tree for queryq0 is constructed by principalp0, p1, and
p2 in a distributed way. Principalp0 receives queryq0 and issues subqueryq1 to principal
p1 to construct a proof treeT0, and principalp1 similarly issues queryq2 to principalp2 to
construct a proof treeT1. The facts or rules in the proof treesT0, T1, andT2 are not dis-
closed to other principals; the result of evaluating each proof tree is returned to the querier
as a boolean value or conjunction of encrypted boolean values.
Example. Figure3.6shows the proofs in the evaluation of the query?grant(bob), involv-
ing p1, p2 andp3. The query?grant(bob) from principalp0 to p1 is decomposed into two
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Security policies
Knowledge base Knowledge base






rule1 ≡ grant(P )← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)
rule1 ≡ grant(P )← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)
(p0, TRUE)
(p1, TRUE) (p1, TRUE)
?grant(bob)
?role(bob, doctor) ?location(bob, hospital)
role(bob, doctor) location(bob, hospital)
trust(grant(P )) = {p1}
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2}
trust(location(P,L)) = {p3}
Figure 3.6: The solid arrows are labeled with queries and the dashed arrows are labeled
with returned proofs. The rounded rectangles with dotted lines represent the knowledge
bases and security policies of those principals respectively.
sub-queries?role(bob, doctor) and?location(bob, hospital) according to the rulerule1 ≡
grant(X) ← role(X, doctor) ∧ location(X, hospital), and those subqueries are handled
by principalp2 andp3 respectively. Principalp2 has the matching factrole(bob, doctor)
in its knowledge base and returns the proof(p1,TRUE ) to principalp1. Principalp3 also
returns the proof(p1,TRUE ). Principalp1 trusts the integrity of the proofs fromp2 andp3
according to its integrity policies, and internally constructs the proof tree that contains the
rule rule1 as a root node and the factsrole(bob, doctor) andlocation(bob, hospital) as its
children nodes. Principalp1 concludes that the statementgrant(bob) is trueand returns the
proof (p0,TRUE ).
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3.4 Enforcement of confidentiality policies
The enforcement of each principal’s confidentiality policies is different from that in many
existing authorization systems, which check the privileges of a requester principal before
divulging information directly to the requester. In our system, a principal that publishes a
proof chooses the receiver of the proof from a list of upstream principals in the whole proof
tree; a query is appended with an ordered list of upstream principals that could receive the
query result. Therefore, it is possible to obtain an answer for a query even when a querier
principal does not satisfy the handler principal’s confidentiality policies. The principal
may make that choice because its confidentiality policy does not allow it to divulge the
information to the querier, but may allow the information to be released to another principal
further up the tree. The encrypted result will become part of the querier’s response up the
tree; eventually the receiver principal may decrypt the result and compute the conjunction
to see whether the tree istrue.
We formally define the ordered list of upstream principals as follows. We say that
a principalrepresentsa proof-tree node when a rule or a fact contained in that node is
published by that principal. We denote the principal that represents noden asrep(n), and
the ordered list of principals that represent a corresponding ordered list of nodess asrep(s).
Suppose that principalp represents a noden in a proof tree. We denote the ordered list of
nodes on the path from the root of the proof tree ton, excludingn, asupstream nodes(n).
That is, the nodes are ordered from the root node downward.
The list of upstream principals forp is defined asrep(upstream nodes(n)), which we
denote asreceivers(p) for brevity, in the case of a specific tree. In Figure3.7, principalp0’s
issuing queryq0 causes principalsp1 andp2 to issue subqueriesq1, q2 andq3. Principalp3’s
list receivers(p3) is < p0, p1, p2 >, for example.






(q0, < p0 >) (q1, < p0, p1 >)
(q2, < p0, p1, p2 >)
(q3, < p0, p1, p2 >)
pf
1







Figure 3.7: Principalp0’s queryq0 is handled by principalsp1, p2, p3, andp4 in a distributed
way. Principalpi handles queryqi−1, and returns the proofpfi, for i = 1 to 4. Each query
is attached with an ordered list of upstream principals.
must satisfy the following two conditions. First, it must satisfy the publisher’s confidential-
ity policies. For example, suppose that principal4 choosesp1 as the receiver of queryq3’s
result. Principalp1 must satisfyp4’s confidentiality policies for queryq3; that is,p4 must
have a confidentiality policy(rp, t) where rule patternrp matches queryq3 and principal
p1 belongs to a set of principalst.
Second, the receiver principal must satisfy the constraints due to recursive encryption
of a proof at each principal. A principal that handles a query might issue subqueries to
other principals. If that principal cannot decrypt the query results in those subproofs, it
includes the subproofs into its proof and encrypts them with the public key of a receiver
principal. This recursive encryption is necessary to prevent an untrusted intermediate prin-
cipal on the path towards the receiver from knowing the query result by decrypting some
subproof whose query result isFALSE. Because such embedded encrypted subproofs are
encrypted recursively by intermediate principals until they reach their receiving principals,
the intermediate principals have to make sure that their encryption on embedded subproofs
are decrypted when the proof reaches the receiving principals of the subproofs. Otherwise,
the embedded subproofs pass the receiving principals without being decrypted, and the
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proof fails.
In Figure3.7, principalp3 choosesp0 as the receiver of proofpf3 ≡ (p0, (value3)K0)
wherevalue3 is queryq2’s result andK0 is p0’s public key, andp4 choosesp1 as the receiver
of proof pf4. Principalp2 embeds those proofs fromp3 andp4 into proofpf 2, becausep2
cannot decrypt those proofs but knows that the query result for queryq1 is the conjunction
of the query results in those encrypted proofs. Suppose that both principalp0 andp1 in
receivers(p2) satisfy the first condition; they satisfyp2’s confidentiality policies for query
q1. Principalp2 must choosep1 as the receiver to satisfy the second condition. Notice
that principalp2 encrypts the proofs from principalsp3 andp4 with principal p1’s public
key. This recursive encryption is necessary to prevent an attack by malicious upstream
principals as we discuss in Section3.4.
When principalp1 decrypts and evaluates the proofpf4, if the result is true thenp1 only
embedspf 3 into proof pf 1, which is decrypted by principalp0; otherwise,p2 drops the
proofpf 3 and return a proof that contains aFALSEvalue. If principalp2 choosesp0 as the
receiver of proofpf 2 instead, the proofpf 4, which is embedded in proofpf 2, is forwarded
to p0 without being decrypted byp1 and the proof is not usable byp0.
In general, a proof contains any number of encrypted subproofs. Suppose that principal
pi’s list receivers(pi) is < p0, . . . , pi−1 >, andpi returns proofpf i that contains subproofs
pf j for j = 0, . . . , n−1 to principalpk. Letpr(j) be the receiver principal for proofp j, and
index (p, s) be the function that returnsp’s index in the ordered lists. The second condition
for selecting a receiver is stated as follows.
∀j ((index (pr(j), receivers(pi)) ≤ index (pk, receivers(pi))) ∨ (r(j) = i))
If there is more than one principal that satisfies the above two conditions, principalpk
chooses the principal of the minimum index (closest to the root). This guideline is impor-
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tant not to narrow the choices of the receivers made by the upstream principals. Note that
the proof fails if the path to the root does not permit these decryptions and validations; the
failure results because the integrity and confidentiality policies of the principals involved
will not allow the necessary information sharing. We, therefore, anticipate that an addition
of rules or policies by principals would increase the false negative rate of authorization
decisions.
Attack by colluding principals. A principal must encrypt proofs from other principals
with the public key of a receiver principal when the proof to the receiver principal contains
those proofs, as we see in the example in Figure3.7. This recursive encryption is necessary
to prevent an attack by colluding upstream principals that modify a receivers list attached
with a query.
We describe such an attack with an example in Figure3.8. Suppose that principals
p1 andp2 are malicious colluding principals. Whenp1 issues a queryq1, p1 produces the
incorrect receivers list< p1, p0 > instead of the correct list< p0, p1 >. Another malicious
principalp2 issues a queryq2 with the receivers list< p1, p0, p2 >; principalp2 just appends
itself at the end of the receivers list obtained fromp1. Principalp1 needsp2’s cooperation,
because ifp2 is not a colluding principal,p2 detectsp1’s modification becausep1 is not at
the end of the receivers list. When principalp2 sends a query top3, p3 cannot detect that
the receivers list is incorrect because principal2 operated legitimately with the exception
of overlookingp1’s incorrect receivers list.
Suppose that principalp3 choosesp0 as the receiver ofp3’s proof, which contains proofs
obtained from principalsp4 andp5 and that principalsp4 andp5 choose principalsp0 and
p1 as the receivers of their proofs respectively. If principal3 does not encrypt the proofs
from p4 andp5 with p0’s public key, principalp1, who receives those proofs beforep0 does,
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Figure 3.8: Principalsp1 andp2 are malicious colluding principals. Principalp1 produces
the incorrect receivers list with a queryq1. The elements ordered incorrectly in the receivers
list are shown with bold fonts. For brevity, we omit the receivers list for queriesq3 andq4.
legitimate privilege ifp5’s proof contains aFALSE value, because the result ofq2 is the
conjunction of the values contained in the proofs fromp4 andp5. If p5’s proof contains a
TRUE value,p1 is still not sure about the query result, though.
3.5 Algorithms for the base case
Each host (run by some principal) provides an interfaceHANDLEREMOTEQUERY for han-
dling a query from a remote host. It takes as parameters a query stringq, a list of up-
stream principalsreceiversdefined in Section3.4, and a querier principal’s integrity poli-
ciesi policies, as shown in Figure3.9. The functionHANDLEREMOTEQUERY calls the
functionGENERATEPROOF to obtain a proof.
Figure3.10shows the algorithm for the functionGENERATEPROOF, run on principal
p1’s host to build a proof while enforcing confidentiality policies of the handler principal
p1. The function takes several parameters: principalp0 that issues a query, principalp1 that
handles a query, a query stringq, a noncen, a list of upstream principalsreceivers for p1
(i.e., receivers(p1)), p0’s integrity policiesi policies0, p1’s integrity policiesi policies1,








Figure 3.9: Query interface.
cipal p0’s integrity policies are provided to the function as a parameter for principalp1 to
avoid wasting effort by constructing a proof that does not satisfy the querierp0’s integrity
policies; a principalp0 later uses its integrity policiesi policies0 to check the integrity of a
proof returned fromp1.
If p0 is an initial querier, it includes itself into the listreceivers.
Lines 2–3 check whether there is any principal in the listreceivers that satisfies the
handler principalp1’s confidentiality policies. The principals that belong to the intersection
of receivers and the union of the access-control lists inp1’s confidentiality policies for
queryq are eligible to receive a proof fromp1. We treat the ordered listreceivers as a set in
line 2, and denote the result set ass. If there is no such principal (i.e., the sets is empty),
line 4 returns a proof with aREJECTvalue to querier principalp0.
Line 5 sets the receiver principal of a proof in the case that the query result in the proof
is obtained locally. The chosen receiver is the principal that belongs to lists and has the
minimum index in the ordered listreceivers. We choose that principal with the function
minIndex (s, receivers) in line 5. Let index (p, receivers) be the function that returns the
index of a principalp in the listreceivers. We defineminIndex (s, receivers) as the function
that returns a principalp that satisfies the following conditions.
p ∈ s ∧ ∀p′ | ((p′ ∈ s) ∧ (index (p, receivers) ≤ index (p′, receivers)))
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We use the symbol ‘|’ to denote “such that” in our algorithm for brevity. Line 7 checks
whether the handler principalp1 satisfies the querierp0’s integrity policies. If not, line 8
returns a proof with aFALSEvalue to principalpr. Line 9 checks whether queryq matches
factf in p1’s knowledge base. If so, line 10 returns a proof with aTRUEvalue to principal
pr.
Lines 11–19 cover the case that queryq matches the head of ruler in p1’s knowledge
base. Line 12 unifies queryq and ruler ≡ A ← B1, . . . , Bk, resulting in the instantiated
rule A′ ← B′1, . . . , B′k. Lines 13–14 obtain subproofs for the subqueriesB′1, . . . , B′k iter-
atively. Line 15 sets the conjunction of all the subproofs into a variablepfs, and line 16
decrypts subproofs that can be decrypted by principalp1 by calling the functionDECRYPT-
PROOFS in Figure3.11. The functionDECRYPTPROOFSconstructs a proof that contains
subproofs that are not decrypted. If a proof is not constructed, it returns aNULL value.
When lines 7–18 fail to construct a proof that derives queryq, our algorithm does
not return a proof that containsFALSE immediately. Instead, it tries to obtain a proof
from a remote principal in lines 21–32. Line 21 creates an empty setacc ssed that will
contain a set of remote principals. Line 22 appendsp1 into thereceivers list and sets it
into another ordered listrcvrs, using the functionconcat that appends a principal in the
second parameter into the list in the first parameter. The ordered listrcvrs is used as one
of the parameters for a remote query below. Lines 22–31 obtain a proof for queryfrom a
remote principal. Line 22 checks whether there is any principalpl that satisfiesp1’s integrity
policies for queryq and does not belong to the setaccessed . The setaccessed maintains
a list of principals to which the remote query is already issued. Line 23 calls the function
ISSUEREMOTEQUERY with the remote principalpl, the queryq, the noncen, the ordered
list rcvrs, and the integrity policiesi policies1 as parameters, and that function returns a
proof from principalpl. Line 24 checks whether the proof contains the same nonce and
query given as parameters of the remote query, and line 25 checks whether principalp1
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is the receiver of that proof. Lines 26–28 handle the case that a set of proofsfs actually
contains just a valueTRUEor FALSE. If that holds true, line 26 checks whether the proof
contains aTRUEvalue. If so, line 27 returns a proof that contains aTRUEvalue to principal
pr; otherwise, it returns a proof that contains aFALSEvalue similarly. Line 29 decrypts
the proof by calling the functionDECRYPTPROOFS. If the returned proofpf ′ is notNULL,
line 31 returns that proof; otherwise, line 32 puts principall into the setaccessed . This
process is iterated until the while loop in lines 22–32 obtains a proof or finishes trying all
the remote principals. Finally, line 33 returns a proof with aFALSEvalue, since there is no
other way to construct a proof for queryq.
Algorithm for decrypting a set of proofs. Figure3.11shows the algorithm for decrypt-
ing a set of proofs obtained from remote principals. The functionDECRYPTPROOFStakes
as parameters a principalpc whose private key is used to decrypt the proofs, a set of proofs
pfs obtained from remote principals, a default receiver principal chosen by principalpc, and
a set of principals to whom principalpc could send a proof, and the ordered listreceivers.
Line 1 checks whether the format of the proofsp is valid, and line 2 checks whether
all the subproofs that can be decrypted by principalpc contains aTRUEvalue. If that holds
true, line 3 returns a proof with aTRUEvalue to principalpr. Line 4 checks whether all the
subproofs decrypted bypc contain aTRUEvalue, and if so, line 5 checks whether there is
some principalpr′ that satisfies the constraint due to the recursive encryption we describe
in Section3.4; that is,pr′ ’s index in the ordered listreceivers must be greater than or equal
to the index ofpr(i) in receivers if r(i) 6= 1. If there is such a principalpr′, line 6 returns
a proof containing the subproofs whose values could not be decrypted byp1 with principal
pr′ as the recipient. If all the above attempts to return a proof, line 7 returns aNULL value,
which means that the function fails to return a proof.
We extend the algorithms in this section to support the general case in Section4.5a d
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GENERATEPROOF(p0, p1, q, n, receivers, i policies0, i policies1, c policies1,KB1)
1  Check whether there is any principal inreceivers that satisfiesp1’s confidentiality policies.
2 s← receivers ∩ (
⋃
i ti) for all policies(rpi, ti) ∈ c policies1 whererpi matchesq
3 if s = ∅ if sets is empty.
4 then return (p0, n, (REJECT )K0)
5 pr ← minIndex(s, receivers)
6  Check whether principalp1 satisfies querierp0’s integrity policies.
7 if ¬(∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policies0) ∧ (rp matchesq) ∧ (p1 ∈ t)))
8 then return (pr, n, (FALSE )Kr )
9 if ∃ factf | ((f ∈ KB1) ∧ (f matchesq))
10 then return (pr, n, (TRUE )Kr )
11 elseif∃ rule r ≡ A← B1, . . . , Bk | ((r ∈ KB1) ∧ (A matchesq))
12 then unify q andA← B1, . . . , Bk, resulting inA′ ← B′1, . . . , B′k
13 for i← 1 to k
14 do pf i ← GENERATEPROOF(p1, p1, B′i, receivers, i policies1, i policies1, c policies1,KB1)
wherepf i = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)), andr(i) is the receiver principal ofpf i
15 pfs ← ∧n1pf i
16 pf ← DECRYPTPROOFS(p1, pfs, pr, s, receivers)
17 if pf 6= NULL
18 then return pf
19  If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally, we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
20 accessed ← ∅
21 rcvs← concat(receivers, p1)
22 while ∃ principalpl ((pl /∈ accessed) ∧ ∃ policy p = (rp, t) ((p ∈ i policies1) ∧ (rp matchesq) ∧ (pl ∈ t)))
23 do pf ← ISSUEREMOTEQUERY(pl, q, n, rcvs, i policies1) wherepf = (pr′ , q′, n′, (pfsK1)
24 if q = q′ ∧ n = n′
25 then if pr′ = p1
26 then if pfs = TRUE
27 then return (pr, n, (TRUE )Kr )
28 else return (pr, n, (FALSE )Kr )
29 elsepf ′ ← DECRYPTPROOFS(p1, pfs, pr, s, receivers)
30 if pf ′ 6= NULL
31 then return pf ′
32 elseaccessed ← accessed ∪ {pl}
33 return (pr, n, (FALSE )Kr )
Figure 3.10: Algorithm for generating a proof.
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DECRYPTPROOFS(pc, pfs, pr, s, receivers)
1 if pfs = ∧n1pfi wherepfi = (pr(i), vali)
2 then if ∀i ((pfi = (pc, (vali)Kc)) ∧ (vali = TRUE ))
3 then return (pr, (TRUE )Kr )
4 elseif∀i ((pf i = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i))) ∧ (((r(i) 6= c) ∨ ((r(i) = c) ∧ (valuei = TRUE ))))
5 then if ∃ pr′ | (∀i (((pr′ ∈ s) ∧ (index(pr(i), receivers) ≤ index(pr′ , receivers)) ∧ (r(i) 6= c))
∨(r(i) = 1)))
6 then return (pr′ , (∧i pf i)Kr′ )
for all i wherepf i = (pr(i), (valuei)Kr(i)) ∧ (r(i) 6= c)
7 else returnNULL
Figure 3.11: Algorithm for decrypting a set of proofs.
provide the correctness proof in Section4.6.
3.6 Example application
Consider again our initial example of an incident management system (IMS) shown in Fig-
ure2.1; a centralized server would produce the proof tree in Figure2.2. Figure3.12shows
how userbob (principal p0) requests images from the surveillance camera image server
managed by the airport (principalp1). Bob’s request is handled by multiple principals
p1, p2, . . . , p7. In Figure3.12, every principal issues queries to the principals that satisfy
its integrity policies, and every querier except for principal2 satisfies the confidential-
ity policies of the principals to which it sends the queries. Principalp2 does not satisfy
p4’s confidentiality policies for query?location(bob, airport), becausep2 is temporarily
assigned to manage the role server for the incident, and thus principalp4 does not establish
a long-term trust relation with principalp2. Fortunately,p1 that runs the surveillance cam-
era image server satisfiesp4’s confidentiality policies, principalp4 encrypts the query result
with p1’s public key, and principalp2 embedsp4’s proof into its own proof, then returns it
to p1. Principalp1 decrypts the query result in the proof fromp2, but it is not aware of the










?role(bob, police chief, police dept) ?location(bob, airport)
?owner(bob, pda15) ?location(pda15, L)
?wifi(pda15, ap39)
(p1, (p1, (TRUE)K1))
(p2, (TRUE)K2) (p1, (TRUE)K1)
(p4, (TRUE)K4) (p4, (TRUE)K4)
(p6, (TRUE)K6)
grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief)
role(P, operation chief)
← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
location(P,L) ← owner(P,D) ∧ location(D,L)
location(D,L) ← in(A,L) ∧ wifi(D,A)









Figure 3.12: Example of an emergency response system. Principalp0 is a first responder
whose role is “operationchief”. Principalp1 represents a surveillance camera image server.
Principalp2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS). Prin-
cipal p3 is the role membership server of a police department. Principalp4 represents a
location-tracking service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals.
Each arrow is labeled with a query and a returned proof. The query is shown above the
dashed line; the proof is shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and confiden-
tiality policies are shown in a dashed rectangle.
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Chapter 4
Secure distributed proof system for the
general case
In this chapter, we extend our proof system so that it supports confidentiality and integrity
policies on rules as well as on facts. A proof contains a proof tree that describes the deriva-
tion of the query’s result if the evaluation of a query istrue, instead of simply the result
TRUE, in order to satisfy a querier principal’s integrity policies. This situation occurs when
the querier principal does not trust the integrity of the query result from the handler princi-
pal, but trusts handler’s rule that is used to decompose the query into subqueries. We first
describe the representation of a proof that contains a proof tree and then explain how the
enforcement mechanisms for confidentiality and integrity policies should be extended to
support policies on rules. Finally, we give an extended algorithm that supports a proof that
contains a proof tree and provide its soundness proof.
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4.1 Representation of a proof
We represent aproof using nested parentheses based on the grammar in Figure4.1. A proof
contains five fields: a sender principal, a receiver principal, a query, a nonce, and a proof
tree optionally encrypted for a receiver. The sender is the principal that publishes a proof,
and the receiver is the intended receiver of the proof. The query is a query string for which
the proof is constructed, the nonce is a random number chosen by a querier principal, and
the proof tree represents how the evaluation result for the query is derived.
The hierarchical structure of a proof tree is built by embedding subproofs into a proof
recursively. That is, the proof contains a proof tree that consists of a root node (representing
a rule) of the proof tree and the subproofs that contain the subproof trees under the root
node. Therefore, each node in a proof tree described in Section2.2 has a corresponding
proof (or an embedded subproof) that contains it as the root node of its proof tree. If a
proof contains a single-node proof tree, it only contains a query result or a set of proofs
whose query results are encrypted as described in Section3.4. The digital signature of a
proof is attached with the proof as in the basic case in Chapter3, but the main purpose is
to check the integrity of a proof that contains subproofs produced by multiple principals.
The digital signature also ensuresnon-repudiabilityof the sender principal. If a query
result depends on encrypted values, it is represented as a set of value pairs that consist of a
receiver principal and an encrypted query result, as we describe in Section4.6.
The first four fields in a proof are necessary to verify the integrity of its proof tree.
The sender’s identity is necessary to check the authenticity of a proof by checking a digital
signature attached with the proof. To verify a proof, one must verify the integrity of all the
embedded subproofs in that proof, which are published by different principals. Therefore,
every principal that publishes the subproof needs to attach a digital signature with it. We
omit the digital signature of a proof from our syntax in Figure4.1for brevity. The receiver’s
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< proofs > ::= < proof > (< proof >) ∗
< proof > ::= ‘(’ < sender >,< receiver >,< query >,< nonce >,< proof tree > ‘)’
< proof tree > ::= ‘(’ < rule cert >, ‘(’ < proofs > ‘)’‘ )’ | < proofs > | < value pairs >
| < value >
< sender > ::= < identifier >
< receiver > ::= < identifier >
< query > ::= < atom >
< atom > ::= < predicate > ‘(’ < args > ‘)’
< predicate > ::= < identifier >
< args > ::= < arg > (, < arg >) ∗
< arg > ::= < identifier >
< nonce > ::= < number >
< rule cert > ::= ‘(’ < rule >,< signer > ‘)’
< rule > ::= < head >←< body >
< head > ::= < atom >
< body > ::= < atom > (∧ < atom >) ∗
< signer > ::= < identifier >
< value pairs > ::= < value pair > (< value pair >) ∗
< value pair > ::= ‘(’ < receiver >,< value > ‘)’
< value > ::= ‘TRUE ’ | ‘FALSE ’ | ‘REJECT ’
< identifier > ::= < string >
< string > ::= < string >< character > | < character >
< character > ::= a| . . . |z|A| . . . |Z|0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
< number > ::= < number >< digit > | < digit >
< digit > ::= 0|1|2|3|4|5|6|7|8|9
Figure 4.1: Grammar for a proof. A sender principal attaches a digital signature with its
publishing proof, and optionally encrypts theproof tree field of a proof. We, however,
omit the digital signatures and encryptions from our syntax. The major differences from
the grammar in Figure3.3 is that a proof has thesenderfield and that the proof contains a
proof treeinstead of a boolean value.
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identity is necessary when a proof tree is encrypted by the receiver’s public key as we
discuss in Section3.4. The nonce is necessary to prevent a malicious principal from reusing
a proof for an identical query at an earlier time.
When we verify the integrity of the query result in a proof, we check the principal that
signs the proof. However, when we also verify the integrity of a rule in a proof, we check
the principal that defines that rule. That principal may be different from the one that applies
the rule to handle a query. Therefore, the rule is paired with the principal that defines it
so that the principal that receives a proof can obtain the digitally signed certificate of that
rule separately to check the integrity of the rule. For example, if principalp0 issues a
query top1 and obtains a proof that contains a ruler from p1. However, that rule could be
actually defined by another principalp2 specified in thesignerfield of the derivation rule for
rule cert in Figure4.1. Principalp0 can check the authenticity of the rule by downloading
a certificate thatp2 signed on the rule.
Example. The example in Figure4.2 is a modification of Figure3.6. Principalp0 has
different integrity policies, and, as a result, principalp1 returns a proof that contains a
proof tree. Principalp0 does not trust the integrity ofp1 to evaluate the query?grant(bob),
but does trust the integrity ofrule1. Principalp1 constructs a proof that consists of the
rule rule1 as a root node and the sub-proofsproof 2 and proof 3 as leaf nodes and re-
turns it to principalp0. The proof tree constructed by principalp1 is trusted by princi-
pal p0 because principalp0 trustsrule1 in principalp1 and the factsrole(bob, doctor) and
location(bob, hospital) in principalsp2 andp3 respectively, according to its integrity poli-
cies. The proofsproof 2 andproof 3 embedded in proofproof 1 must be attached with the











rule1 ≡ grant(P )← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)
role(bob, doctor) location(bob, hospital)
proof1 ≡ (p1, p0, ?grant(bob), (rule1, (proof2, proof3)))
proof2 ≡ (p2, p1, ?role(bob, doctor), TRUE) proof3 ≡ (p3, p1, ?location(bob, hospital), TRUE)
?grant(bob)
?role(bob, doctor) ?location(bob, hospital)
trust(grant(P )← role(P, doctor) ∧ location(P, hospital)) = {p1}
trust(role(P, doctor)) = {p2}
trust(location(P,L)) = {p3}
Figure 4.2: Construction of a proof tree. The solid arrows are labeled with queries and the
dashed arrows are labeled with returned proof trees. The rounded rectangles with dotted
lines represent the knowledge bases or security policies of those principals respectively.
We omit nonce and digital signatures in the proofs for brevity.
4.2 Decomposition of proof trees
In the general case, a response to a query is a proof that contains a proof tree that satisfies
the integrity policies of a querier. If the integrity of the principal that handles a query is
trusted by the querier, it only returns a single-node proof tree that contains a query result.
If there are such principals participating in evaluating a query, the whole proof tree is
decomposed into several subtrees and is evaluated by those principals in a distributed way.
The facts and rules used for evaluating a subtree do not have to be disclosed to a querier
principal.
In Figure4.3, principalsp0, p1, . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating a query, and
each arrow shows how a proof tree flows from one principal to another. We show only the
fields for a sender and a receiver principals for brevity, omitting other fields. The dashed
lines show which principal’s integrity policies are applied to the principals enclosed in the
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(p1, p0, ((p3, p1), (p4, p1))) (p2, p0)
(p3, p0)
(p4, p0) (p5, p2) (p6, p2, ((p9, p2), (p10, p2)))
(p7, p3) (p8, p3) (p9, p2) (p10, p2)
p0’s integrity policies
p2’s integrity policiesp3’s integrity policies
Figure 4.3: Example of subproofs. Principalsp0, . . . , p10 are the participants in evaluating
a query. Each arrow shows how a proof tree flows from one principal to another. Each
arrow is labeled with the pair of a sender and a receiver principals in a proof, omitting
the other fields of the proof for brevity. The dashed lines show which principal’s integrity
policies are applied to the principals enclosed in the lines. The principalsp0, p2, andp3 that
represent the root node of the nested subtrees are enclosed in the thick rectangles.
queries; it is possible to evaluate the query atp0, p2, andp3 rather than collecting all the
rules and facts atp0. Principalsp2 andp3 construct a proof tree locally based on their
own integrity policies, and return only a single-node proof tree that contains a query result.
Therefore, principalp0 does not know how the query results fromp2 andp3 are derived.
A principal that issues a query attaches its local or a upstream principal’s integrity policies
with the query so that those policies are shared with downstream principals as we explain
in Section4.5.
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4.3 Enforcement of confidentiality policies
We apply the same mechanism for enforcing confidentiality policies as in Section3.4. The
only difference is that a receiver principal must be an upstream principal that evaluates a
proof subtree. We, therefore, define a set of principalsreceivers(p) whose members are
eligible to receive principalp’s proof as follows.
Suppose that in a proof tree there is a sequence of nodesn0, n1, . . . , nk on the path
from the rootn0 to nodenk in the proof tree, and principalpi represents nodeni and
handles queryqi−1 from pi−1 for i = 1 to k. Principalpi wherei < k belongs to the set
receivers(pk) if it satisfies either of the following two conditions.
• Principalpi is p0.
• There exists principalpl that belongs toreceivers(pk), pl has an integrity policy
(rp, t) such that rule patternrp matches queryqi−1 andpi belongs to the set of prin-
cipalst (i.e., trust(rp)), and there is no other principalpj (wherel < j < i), that
satisfies this condition.
Example. We explain the above definition ofreceivers(pk) with an example in Fig-
ure4.4. Suppose that principalp0 issues a query?grant(Bob) to p1, and principalp1 and
p2 issue subsequent queries?role(Bob, doctor) and?location(Bob, hospital) respectively.
We decide the members ofreceivers(p3) as follows. Since principalp0 satisfies the first
condition, principalp0 belongs toreceivers(p3). Next, we consider the second condition.
Principalp0 defines an integrity policyp2 ∈ trust0(role(P, R)) (i.e., (role(P, R), {p2})).
The rule patternrole(P, R) of the integrity policy matches queryole(Bob, hospital) that
p2 handles, andp2 belongs to the trust list of the integrity policy. In addition, principal1




p0 p1 p2 p3
?grant(Bob) ?role(Bob, doctor) ?location(Bob, hospital)
p1 ∈ trust0(grant(P ) :- role(P,R))
p2 ∈ trust0(role(P,R))
Figure 4.4: Example of a receivers list.
handlep0’s query. Therefore, principalp2 satisfies the second condition, and two principals
p0 andp2 belong toreceivers(p3).
Notice that our new definition does not change the definition ofreceivers(p) in Sec-
tion 3.4, because every principal issues a query to a principal that it trusts in terms of the
integrity of evaluating the query. That is, if a querier principali−1 in receivers(p) issues
queryqi−1 to pi, pi belongs toreceivers(p) as well becausepi satisfies the second condition
above. In other words, all the upstream principals ofp belong to the setreceivers(p).
4.4 Hybrid encryption
When our system performs a public-key encryption, it first generates a symmetric key
randomly and encrypts a proof with that symmetric key. We only use a public key to
encrypt the symmetric key. To decrypt a proof, the system first decrypts the symmetric key
with the receiver’s private key and then decrypts the proof with that symmetric key.
4.5 Algorithms
Each host provides the same remote interface for handling a remote query. We describe
the extended version of the functionGENERATEPROOF, and then introduce the function
CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY that checks the integrity of a proof tree that contains rules as
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intermediate nodes.
Algorithm for constructing a proof. In Figure 4.6, we extend the algorithm in Fig-
ure 3.10 to support security policies on rules. There are a few modifications as follows.
First, a proof has additional fields such as a sender principal, a query string, and a nonce
according to the representation of a proof in Section4.1. We use the parameter namesrcvrs,
i pol0, i pol1, andc pol1 instead ofreceivers, i policies0, i policies1, andc policies1 re-
spectively for compactness.
Second, the algorithm handles a proof from a remote principal that contains multiple
subproofs. The query result of the proof is the conjunction of the query results of all the
embedded subproofs. The query result isTRUE if all the query results of the embedded
subproofs have aTRUEvalue; otherwise, it isFALSE. Lines 15–19 construct a proof from
the proofspfi for i = 1 to k obtained by calling the functionGENERATEPROOF in line 14.
Each proofpf i contains either a query result or multiple subproofs. Therefore, the query
result of the proof is the conjunction of the query results of proofspf i for i = 1 to k, and,
if proof pf i contains multiple subproofs, its query result is represented as the conjunction
of those embedded subproofs. Line 15 checks whether the handler principalp1 can read all
the query results of proofpf i, and all the query results are aTRUEvalue. The query result
of the proof isTRUE if the proof contains aTRUEvalue or all the embedded subproofs
contains aTRUEvalue. If the condition in line 15 holds true, line 16 returns a proof with a
TRUEvalue. Line 17 handles the case that principalp1 cannot decrypt all the query results
in the proofspf i for i = 1 to k and all the decrypted query results have aTRUEvalue. If so,
line 19 checks whether there is a principalr′ that satisfies the constraint due to recursive
encryption. We need to consider all the receiver principals of the embedded subproofs as
well. If there exists such a principalpr′, line 19 returns a proof that contains the subproofs
whose query results cannot be decrypted by principalp1.
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GENERATEPROOF(p0, p1, q, n, rcvrs, i pol0, i pol1, c pol1,KB1)
1  Check whether there is any principal inrcvrs that satisfiesp1’s confidentiality policies.
2 s← rcvrs ∩ (
⋃
i ti) for all policies(rpi, ti) ∈ c pol1 whererpi matchesq
3 if s = ∅ if sets is empty.
4 then return (p1, p0, q, n, (REJECT)K0)
5 pr ← minIndex(s, rcvrs)
6  Check whether principalp1 satisfies querierp0’s integrity policies.
7 if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i pol0) ∧ (rp matchesq) ∧ (p1 ∈ t))
8 then appendp1 to rcvrs
9 if ∃ factf | ((f ∈ KB1) ∧ (f matchesq))
10 then return (p1, pr, q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
11 elseif∃ rule r ≡ A← B1, . . . , Bk | ((r ∈ KB1) ∧ (A matchesq))
12 then unify q andA← B1, . . . , Bk, resulting inA′ ← B′1, . . . , B′k
13 for i← 1 to k
14 do pfi ← GENERATEPROOF(p1, p1, B′i, n, rcvrs, i pol1, i pol1, c pol1,KB1)
wherepfi = (ps(i), pr(i), B
′
i, n, (pti)Kr(i)),
s(i) andr(i) are sender and receiver principals ofpfi respectively.
15 if ∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = vali) ∧ (vali = TRUE))
∨((pti = ∧j(pr(i,j), (valij)Kr(i,j))) ∧ ∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valij = TRUE)))))
16 then return (p1, pr, q, n, (TRUE)Kr )
17 elseif∀i ((r(i) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i) = 1) ∧ (((pti = vali) ∧ (vali = TRUE))
∨ ((pti = ∧j(pr(i,j), (valij)Kr(i,j)))
∧(∀j ((r(i, j) 6= 1) ∨ ((r(i, j) = 1) ∧ (valij = TRUE))))))))
18 then if ∃ pr′ ((pr′ ∈ s) ∧ (∀i ((r(i) = 1) ∨ (((pti = vali)
∧(index(pr(i), rcvrs) ≤ index(pr′ , rcvrs))) ∨ ((pti = ∧j(pr(i,j), (valij)Kr(i,j)))
∧(∀j ((r(i, j) = 1) ∨ (index(pr(i,j), rcvrs) ≤ index(pr′ , rcvrs)))))))))
19 then return (p1, pr′ , q, n, ((∧i (pr(i), pti))(∧ij (pr(i,j), (ptij)Kr(i,j))))Kr′ )
where((pfi = (ps(i), pr(i), B
′
i, n, (pti)Kr(i)) ∧ (r(i) 6= 1))
∨((r(i) = 0) ∧ (pti = ∧j(pr(i,j), (valij)Kr(i,j))) ∧ r(i, j) 6= 1))
20  Return a proof with rules that satisfy principalp0’s integrity policies andp1’s confidentiality policies.
21 return GENERATEPROOFWITHRULES(p0, p1, q, n, rcvrs, i pol0, i pol1, c pol1,KB1)
Figure 4.5: Algorithm for generating a proof.
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We discuss the remaining algorithm in the separate functionGENERATEPROOFWITH-
RULES that is called in line 21.
Third, we handle the case that principal1 is not trusted byp0 in terms of the evaluation
of a query, butp1’s rule, which matches the query, is trusted by principal0, in lines 1–
7. Line 21 checks whether there is a ruleR ≡ A ← B1 ∧ . . . ∧ Bk in p1’s knowledge
base whose headA matches queryq and querier principalp0 satisfiesp1’s confidentiality
policies for ruleR. If there is such ruleR, line 2 checks whether querierp0 has an integrity
policy p = (rp′, t′) that trusts the integrity ofp1’s rule R. Line 3 unifies queryq and rule
R resultingR′ ≡ A′ ← B′1, . . . , B′k. Lines 4–5 obtain the proofs for the atomsB′1, . . . , B′k
iteratively. Line 6 checks whether there is a receiver principalpr′ in the set of principals
rcvrs that satisfies the constraints due to recursive encryption described in Section3.4. If
that holds true, we return the proof that contains ruleR′ as the root node of the proof tree,
and the proofs forB′1, . . . , B
′
k as the subproofs under the root node. The proof tree must
contain the proofs whose proof trees are decrypted byp1 to satisfy the receiver principal’s
integrity policies.
Fourth, when principalp1 tries to construct a proof by issuing a remote query, we need
to check whether querier principalp0 trusts the integrity of the query result from handler
principalp1. Line 11 checks that condition by checking whetherp1 belongs torcvrs, be-
cause line 8 in the functionGENERATEPROOFappendsp1 to rcvrs if the condition holds.
If that holds true, line 12 issues a remote query withp1’s integrity policiesi pol1. That is,
p1’s integrity policies are applied to the succeeding queries. Line 13 checks the integrity of
the returned proof by calling the functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY. The function returns
a pair of a boolean value (true or false) and a simplified proof as we explain below. If
the proof satisfiesp1’s integrity policies, line 15 returns the proof returned by the function
CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY. If p1 does not belong torcvrs, line 17 issues a remote query
with principalp0’s integrity policies; that is, the querier principal’s integrity policies are ap-
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GENERATEPROOFWITHRULES(p0, p1, q, n, rcvrs, i pol0, i pol1, c pol1,KB1)
1 if (∃ ruleR | ((R ∈ KB1) ∧ (R ≡ A← B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk) ∧(A matchesq)))
∧(∃ policy p | ((p ∈ c policies1) ∧ (p = (rp, t)) ∧ rp matches ruleR)))
2 then if ∃ policy p′ = (rp′, t′) | ((p′ ∈ i pol0) ∧ (rp′ matchesR) ∧ (p1 ∈ t′))
3 then unify q and ruleR resultingR′ ≡ A′ ← B′1, . . . , B′k
4 for i← 1 to k
5 do pfi ← GENERATEPROOF(p1, p1, B′i, n, rcvrs, i pol0, i pol1, c pol1,KB1)
wherepfi = (ps(i), pr(i), B
′
i, n, (pti)Kr(i)), and
s(i) andr(i) are sender and receiver principals ofpfi
6 if ∃pr′ ((pr′ ∈ s) ∧ (∀i (index(pr(i), rcvrs) ≤ index(pr′ , rcvrs))))
7 then return (p1, pr′ , q, n, ((R′, pc),∧i pfi)Kr′ )
wherepc is a signer principal of ruleR
8  If we fail to construct a proof that derives the query locally,
 we try to obtain a proof from a remote principal.
9 accessed← ∅
10 while ∃ principalpl that is capable of handling queryq and does not belong to the setaccessed
11 do if p1 ∈ rcvrs
12 then proof← ISSUEREMOTEQUERY(pl, q, rcvrs, i pol1)
13 (trusted, proof ′)← CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY(p1, q, n, proof, i pol1)
14 if trusted
15 then return proof’
16 elseaccessed← accessed∪ {pl}
17 else proof← ISSUEREMOTEQUERY(pl, q, rcvrs, i pol0)
18 return proof
19 return (p1, pr, q, n, (FALSE)Kr )
Figure 4.6: Algorithm for generating a proof that contains rules as intermediate nodes.
plied to the succeeding queries. Line 18 returns the proof returned by the function without
checking its integrity. In other words, only principals trusted by their querier principals in
terms of the integrity of their query results need to enforce their integrity policies on proofs
received from remote principals. Finally, line 19 returns a proof with aFALSEvalue, since
there is no other way to construct a proof for queryq.
Algorithm for checking the integrity of a proof. The functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY
in Figure4.7 checks whether a proof satisfies given integrity policies, based on the defi-
nition given in Section2.4.1. It takes as parameters principalpc that checks the integrity
of the proof, query stringq, noncenc, proofpf, andpc’s integrity policiesi policiesc. The
function also converts the hierarchical proof tree in a proof into a flat one that contains
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encrypted query results in the leaf nodes; that is, all the intermediate nodes are removed
from the proof tree while checking the integrity of those nodes.
Line 1 checks whether noncen in the proofpf is same as the noncenc for the query.
We assume that the authenticity of the proofpf is also checked by checking the digital
signature attached with the proof in line 1. If that is not true, line 2 returnsfalsewith no
proof tree. Line 3 checks whetherpc trusts the integrity of principalps’s evaluating query
q. If that holds true, line 4 returnstrue with the proof given as a parameter. Line 5 checks
whether principalpc can decrypt the proof (i.e., principalpr is a receiver principal of the
proofpf) and reads ruleR at the root of the proof tree. Notice that all the variables in ruleR
is unified with some constants when the proof tree was constructed. Line 6 checks whether
rule r signed by principalpd satisfiespc’s integrity policies. If that holds true, lines 7–
11 check whether all the proofs for the atoms of ruleR satisfiespc’s integrity policies
by calling the functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY recursively. If all the proofs satisfy the
integrity policies, line 11 returnstrue with the proof that contains the concatenation of the
subproofs that correspond to the leaf nodes of the initial proof tree.
Notice that it is necessary for the principal that checks the integrity of a proof to be able
to read all the rules in the intermediate nodes of the proof tree.
4.6 Soundness of the algorithm
We show that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality and integrity
policies of every participating principal are satisfied.1 We give the proof for the general case
below, which covers the basic case in Chapter3 as its special case. We separate the proof
into two parts: the proof on confidentiality policies, and the proof on integrity policies.
1The other way (completeness of the algorithm) does not hold, as we discuss in Section8.1, and we leave
it as our future work.
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CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY(pc, q, nc, pf, i policiesc)
1 if ¬((pf = (ps, pr, q, n, (pt)Kr)) ∧ (nc = n))
2 then return (false, NULL)
3 if (∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc) ∧ (rp matches queryq) ∧ (ps ∈ t)))
4 then return (true, pf)
5 elseif((r = c) ∧ (pt = ((R, pd), (∧ni=1 pfi))
whereR is a rule,pd is the signer principal ofR, andpfi for i = 1 to n are subproofs.
6 then if ∃ policy p = (rp, t) | ((p ∈ i policiesc) ∧ (rp matches ruleR) ∧ (pd ∈ t)
∧(principalpc holds a valid digital signature forR signed bypd))
whereR ≡ A← B1 ∧ . . . ∧Bk
7 then for i← 1 to k
8 do (trust, pf ′i) = CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY(pc, Bi, pfi, i policiesc)
9 if ¬trust
10 then return (false, NULL)
11 return (true, (pc, pc, q, n, (∧i pf ′i)Kc))
12 else return (false, NULL)
13 else return (false, NULL)
Figure 4.7: Algorithm for checking proof integrity.
4.6.1 Proof for confidentiality policies
We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the confidentiality policies of
every participating principal are satisfied by induction below.
Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree.
Suppose that principalp0 makes queryq to principalp1, andp1, which does not issue any
subqueries, returns a proof whose proof tree only contains a root node. We only need
to show thatp1’s confidentiality policies are satisfied, becausep0 does not disclose any
information in its knowledge base top1. To satisfyp1’s confidentiality policies,p1 must
have a confidentiality policy(rp, t) such that rule patternrp matches queryq andp1 belongs
to the set . The functionGENERATEPROOF in Figure4.6ensures this condition in line 3.




















Case 1: Only principal p0 belongs to the set receivers(pk).
Case 2: Some intermediate principal pl belongs to the set receivers(pk) as well.
Figure 4.8: Linear proof trees with and without an intermediate principal that belongs to the
setreceivers(pk). Black circles denote principals that belong toreceivers(pk), and white
circles denote principals that does not belong toreceivers(pk). Each circle is labeled with
a principal name, and each arrow is labeled with a query name.
Induction step: We next show that, if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is
less thank, then it also holds for a proof tree of depthk. (The base case above considers a
tree of depth 1.) Without loss of generality, we consider the case that a proof tree is linear.
Because our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies on each node depends only on
the nodes on the path from that node to the root in a proof tree; the node is not aware of the
existence of the nodes in other branches of the proof tree.
Suppose that there is a linear tree of depthk where nodesn0, . . . , nk are ordered from
the root to the leaf. Letp0, . . . , pk be the principals that represent nodesn0, . . . , nk respec-
tively, andq0, . . . , qk−1 be the queries, whereqi is the query bypi to pi+1. When principal
p0 issues queryq0 to p1, we consider two cases in Figure4.8. In case 1, only principalp0
belongs to a set of principalsreceivers(pk) defined in Section4.3. In case 2, there are some
other principals in the setreceivers(pk) besides principalp0.
We first consider case 1. Because principal1 does not belong toreceivers(pk), prin-
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cipal p2 cannot distinguish queryq1 issued by principalp1 from q1 issued by principalp0
instead, because all the parameters in those queries are same in both cases; the setreceivers
contains only principalp0 in both cases. The same can be observed forp2, . . . , pk. In the
latter case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for query
q1 is constructed by principalsp2, . . . , pk if their confidentiality policies are satisfied. Be-
cause principalsp2, . . . , pk do not distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm
ensures that their confidentiality policies are preserved in the former case as well. The
function GENERATEPROOF in Figure4.6 ensures principalp1’s confidentiality policies in
lines 3. Principalp0’s confidentiality policies are vacuously satisfied becausep0 does not
disclose any information. We, therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the confidential-
ity policies of the principalsp0, . . . , pk with a proof tree of depthk in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a single
principal pl in receivers(pk) between principalp0 andpk. There are two subcases to be
considered. In the first, subcase 2a, principalpl can decrypt all the nodesnl+1, . . . , nk in
the proof tree for queryql; that is, principalspl+1, . . . , pk choosepl as the receiver of their
returning proofs. Because principalspl+1, . . . , pk do not choosep0 from receivers(pj) =
{p0, pl} for j = l + 1 to k as the receiver principal of their proofs respectively, their algo-
rithm works in the same way as the case where the setrec ivers(pj) = {pl} for j = l to k.
Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the confidentiality policies
of pl+1, . . . , pk. Because principalpl returns a proof with a single-node proof tree, prin-
cipalsp0, . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principalpl issues queryql for handling
queryql−1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures the confidential-
ity policies ofp0, . . . , pl−1. Principalpl’s confidentiality policies are also satisfied because
our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies onpl works in the same way as the case
thatpl does not issue any subqueries and constructs a single-node proof tree responding to
queryql−1, because there is no constraint onpl due to recursive encryption becausepl can
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decrypt all the nodes in the proof frompl+1 topk. Therefore, our claim holds for subcase 2a.
The second subcase 2b is that principall cannot decrypt some nodes in the proof
tree received frompl+1. If principal pl cannot decrypt nodenm betweennl andnk (i.e.,
l < m < k), the proof tree does not satisfypl’s integrity policies, and the proof fails.
We, therefore, only consider the case thatpl cannot decrypt leaf nodenk only. When node
nk choosesp0 as a receiver principal, our algorithm for enforcing confidentiality policies
works for nodesn1, . . . , nk−1 in the same way as the case that nodenk is omitted (i.e.,
principalpk−1 does not issue queryqk−1 to pk) becausepk’s proof encrypted with principal
p0’s public key does not interfere with the processes of principals1, . . . , pk−1 for choosing
a receiver principal of their proofs from the setr ceivers = {p0, pl} or {p0}. The depth
of the tree with nodesn1, . . . , nk−1 is k − 1. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis, our
algorithm ensures that a proof tree is constructed only when the confidentiality policies
of principalsp1, . . . , pk−1 are satisfied. Principalp0’s confidentiality policies are satisfied
vacuously, andpk’s confidentiality policies of principalpk are also satisfied because our
algorithm onpk works in the same way as the case thatpk constructs a proof tree of a single
depth responding to queryqk−1 issued by principalp0. Therefore, our algorithm ensures
that a proof tree is constructed only when the confidentiality policies of every principal is
satisfied. We cover all the cases in terms of confidentiality policies and conclude the proof.
4.6.2 Proof for integrity policies
We prove that our algorithm constructs a proof tree only if the integrity policies of every
participating principal are satisfied by induction below.
Base case: We first show that our claim holds in the case of a single-node proof tree.
Suppose that principalp0 makes queryq0 to principalp1, andp1, which does not issue any
subqueries, returns a single-node proof tree. We only need to show thatp0’s integrity poli-
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cies are satisfied, becausep0 does not disclose any information in its knowledge base. To
satisfyp0’s integrity policies,p0 must have an integrity policy(rp, t) such that rule pattern
rp matches queryq andp1 belongs to set. Line 31 inp0’s function GENERATEPROOF
in Figure4.6 obtains a proof fromp1 by calling the functionISSUEREMOTEQUERY, and
line 32 in the function calls the functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY whose line 3 ensures
that the proof satisfies the above condition. Therefore, principals0 andp1 construct a
proof if their integrity policies are satisfied.
Induction step: We next show that if our claim holds for a proof tree whose depth is less
thank, then it also holds for a proof tree of depthk. We consider the case that a proof
tree is linear as we do in Section4.6.1, because we can check the integrity of a proof tree
by checking whether every path from the root to each leaf node satisfies given integrity
policies. This claim is proved by induction as follows. The base case holds because there
is only a single node in a proof tree. Suppose that our claim holds for a proof tree of
depthk − 1. By induction hypothesis, each subtree of depthk − 1 satisfies the integrity
policies of every participating principal if every path from the root node to each leaf node
satisfies the integrity policies. If every path from the root node to each leaf node in the
proof tree of depthk satisfies integrity policies, the root node must satisfy the policies as
well. According to our definition of the integrity of a proof tree in Section2.4.1, a proof
tree of depthk satisfies given integrity policies if the root node and all the subtrees of depth
k − 1 under the root node satisfy the integrity policies. Therefore, our claim holds for the
proof tree of depthk, and we conclude the proof of the above claim.
We assume the same linear proof tree in Section4.6.1; that is, there is a linear tree of
lengthk where nodesn0, . . . , nk are ordered from the root to the leaf. Letp0, . . . , pk be
the principals that represent nodesn0, . . . , nk respectively, andq0, . . . , qk−1 be the queries
as before. When principalp0 issues queryq0 to p1, we consider the same two cases in
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Figure4.8.
We first consider case 1. Because principalp1 does not belong to the setreceivers(pk),
principalp2 cannot distinguish queryq1 issued by principalp1 from q1 issued by principal
p0 instead, because all the parameters in those queries are same in both cases. In the latter
case, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that a proof tree for queryq1 is
constructed by principalsp2, . . . , pk if their integrity policies are satisfied. Because prin-
cipalsp2, . . . , pk do not distinguish the former case from the latter, our algorithm ensures
their integrity policies in the former case as well. Principal1 checks the integrity of the
proof from principalp2 in the same way regardless of whetherp1’s issuing queryq1 is for
handling queryq0 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,p1’s integrity policies are
satisfied. Principalp0 checks the integrity of the proof from principalp1 with the function
CHECKPROOFINTEGRITY as follows. The integrity of the rule in noden1 is ensured in
line 6, and, by the induction hypothesis, the integrity of the subtree of depthk − 1 from
principalp2 is ensured in line 8 by checking the integrity of the proof tree whose root node
is n2 by calling the functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY recursively. Therefore, the func-
tion ensures thatp0’s integrity policies are satisfied with the proof tree from noden1. We,
therefore, prove that our algorithm ensures the integrity policies of the principalsp0, . . . , pk
with a proof tree of depthk in case 1.
We next consider case 2. Without loss of generality, we assume that there is a principal
pl in receivers(pk) between principalp0 andpk. There are two subcases to be considered.
In the first, subcase 2a, the subproof from principall is a single-node proof tree that
contains a query’s result; principalspl+1, . . . , pk choosepl as the receiver of their nodes.
Because principalsp0, . . . , pl−1 are not aware of the fact that principalpl issues queryql,
by the induction hypothesis, the integrity policies of principalsp0, . . . , pl−1 are satisfied.
The fact that principalp0 belongs to the listreceivers(pl) of queryql does not change the
behaviors of principalspl+1, . . . , pk for handling queryql. Because our algorithm works
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for principalspl, . . . , pk in the same way that principal issues queryql independently, by
the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that principalpl’s integrity policies are
satisfied for subcase 2a.
The second case 2b is that a proof from principalpl contains nodenk whose proof tree
is encrypted withp0’s public key, as it could be done in line 19 of the functionGENER-
ATEPROOF in Figure4.6. The proof frompl does not contain any other encrypted nodes
becausepl needs to read the nodesnl+1, . . . , nk−1 to check the integrity of the proof from
pl+1. Principalpl checks whether the rules in nodesnl+1, . . . , nk−1 satisfiespl’s integrity
policies, which is done in line 6 of the functionCHECKPROOFINTEGRITY in Figure4.7.
If principal pl cannot decrypt all the nodesnl+1, . . . , nk−1, pl returns a proof that contains
FALSEbecause its failure to check the integrity of the proof, and, therefore, the proof tree
for queryq0 is not constructed. Because principalsp0, . . . , pl−1 cannot distinguish whether
the encrypted boolean value in the proof frompl is generated by principalpl or its de-
scendant principalpk, by the induction hypothesis, our algorithm ensures that the integrity
polices of principalsp0, . . . , pl−1 are satisfied ifp0 accepts a proof tree whose leaf nodenl
contains an encrypted boolean value in nodenk.
We next consider the integrity policies of principalspl, . . . , pk. In order for principal
pl to check the integrity of the proof from principalpl+1, pl must read all the intermediate
nodesnl+1, . . . , nk−1 in that proof. Therefore, principalspl+1, . . . , pk−1 must choosepl
as the receiver principal of their returning proofs. Principall+1, . . . , pk−1 work in the
same way as the case that principall issues queryql without receivingql−1 so, by the
induction hypothesis, their integrity policies are preserved. Principalpk’s integrity policies
are satisfied vacuously. Principalpl’s algorithm for enforcing integrity policies does not
read the encrypted value in nodenk and works in the same way regardless of returning a
proof topk−1 or not. Therefore, by the induction hypothesis,pl’s integrity policies are also
preserved. We cover all the cases and conclude the proof.
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4.7 Example application
We revisit the example of an incident management system (IMS); in Figure3.12, every
querier principal trusts the integrity of the principal that handles its query in terms of the
correctness of the query’s result. This time, we have some principals that define security
policies on rules as well as facts.
Figure4.9 shows how userbob (principal p0) requests images from the surveillance
camera image server managed by the airport (principalp1). Principalp1 agrees with the
policy for role operation chief , that is, principalp2’s rule below satisfiesp1’s integrity
policies.
role(P, operation chief )← roleIn(P, police chief , police dept) ∧ in(P, airport)
Therefore, principalp2 that runs the role-membership server of IMS uses that rule to eval-
uate a queryrole(bob, operation chief ). However, principalp1 does not trust the answer
from principalp2, sincep2 is temporarily assigned to manage the role server for the inci-
dent, and thus principalp1 does not establish a long-term trust relation with principalp2.
Fortunately, principalp2 trusts the role-membership server of the police department and
the location tracking service run by principalsp3 andp4 respectively, because those are
long-running existing services. Principalp2 is thus able to return a proof tree that con-
tains the proofs from principalp3 andp4, and principalp1 trusts that proof. The proof tree
also satisfies the confidentiality policies of principalsp2, p3 and p4. Principal p4 only
returns the evaluation result of the query?location(bob, airport) because it belongs to









grant(P ) ← role(P, operation chief)
rule1 ≡ role(P, operation chief)
← roleIn(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)
location(P,L) ← owner(P,D) ∧ location(D,L)
location(D,L) ← in(A,L) ∧ wifi(D,A)
acl(role(P,R)) = {p1}
acl(role(P,R, police dept)) = {p1, p2}
acl(location(P,L)) = {p1, p2}
acl(owner(P,D)) = {p4}
acl(location(D,L)) = {p4}
acl(wifi(D, airport)) = {p6}




(p2, p1, ?role(bob, operation chief),
(rule1, ((p3, p1, ?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept), TRUE), (p4, p1, ?location(bob, airport), TRUE))
(p3, p1, ?role(bob, police chief, police dept), TRUE) (p4, p1, ?location(bob, airport), TRUE)
(p5, p4, ?owner(bob, pda15), TRUE) (p6, p4, ?location(pda15, airport), TRUE)
(p7, p6, ?wifi(pda15, ap39), TRUE)
?role(bob, operation chief)
?roleIn(bob, police chief, police dept) ?location(bob, airport)
?owner(bob, pda15) ?location(pda15, L)
?wifi(pda15, X)
trust(role(P, operation chief) ← role(P, police chief, police dept) ∧ location(P, airport)) = {p2}




Figure 4.9: Example of an emergency response system. Principalp0 is a first respon-
der whose role is “operationchief”. Principalp1 represents a surveillance camera image
server. Principalp2 is the role membership server of an incident management system (IMS).
Principalp3 is the role membership server of a police department. Principalp4 represents
a location-tracking service. The arrows represent the flow of queries among the principals.
Each arrow is labeled with a query and a returned proof tree. The query is shown above the
dashed line; the proof is shown below the line. Each principal’s rules, facts and policies are
shown in a dashed rectangle.
59
Chapter 5
Caching and revocation mechanism
In this chapter, we describe a caching and revocation mechanism that improves the perfor-
mance of our system. Our caching mechanism supports both positive and negative query
results and avoids issuing remote queries, which otherwise cause long latency due to cryp-
tographic operations and the transmission of data over a network.
Our revocation mechanism ensures the freshness of cached information. To be sure
to produce a query result only with information that is generated recently, we need an
efficient mechanism that revokes obsolete cached information. Unlike existing revocation
methods [84, 87, 135] in which only an issuer of a certificate can revoke it, our scheme
must allow multiple hosts to revoke a given cached result because the result might depend
on (contextual) facts maintained by different hosts. Therefore, we develop a revocation
mechanism based on capabilities [110] in a distributed environment.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section5.1introduces our approach for
capability-based revocation, and Section5.2describes the design of our caching and revo-
cation mechanism. Section5.3describes the issue of race conditions among components in
our system and presents our synchronization mechanism to solve that issue. Section5.4dis-
cusses additional requirements for supporting negative caching. Finally, Section5.5shows
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a mechanism that keeps cached information fresh under the presence of an adversary who
is capable of intercepting revocation messages.
5.1 Capability-based revocation
Our caching mechanism allows each principal to cache a fact derived from a constructed
proof, and such a proof for a query could contain rules and facts published by multiple
different principals. Therefore, the derived fact from that proof must be revoked if any
information in the proof becomes invalid; that is, there might be multiple principals that
are eligible to revoke a cached fact. We, therefore, developed a revocation mechanism
based on capabilities [110] so that all the principals involved in constructing a proof may
revoke the derived result from the proof.
We extend the representation of a proof in Section4.1 to associate a query result or a
rule in a proof with a capability, which is a large random number; that is, the nonterminals
rule and value pair in Figure 4.1 additionally include the nonterminalcapability, and
their derivations are thus modified as follows.
< rule > ::= ‘(’ < head >←< body >,< capability > ‘)’
< value pair > ::= ‘(’ < receiver >,< value >,< capability > ‘)’
< capability > ::= < number >
The nonterminalrule includes thecapability to associate a rule with a capability, and,
similarly, the nonterminalvalue pair includes thecapability to associate it with a fact.
Thus, each node in a proof is associated with a capability generated by the principal who
publishes the information in that node. Since a principal who publishes a proof encrypts
the query result and capability together with a receiver principal’s public key, the capability










(p0, ((rule, c1), (pf2)(pf3))K0)
pf
2
≡ (p0, (TRUE, c2)K0)
pf
3
≡ (p0, (TRUE, c3)K0)
Figure 5.1: Capability-based revocation. The dashed line represents a revocation message
sent by principalp3.
principal who sent the proof can later revoke the fact or rule in the proof by sending the
capability to the receiver principal. The sender principal of the revocation message does not
need to authenticate itself to the receiver principal who maintains the cached information.
Figure5.1 describes our revocation scheme in a distributed environment. A principal
p0 issues a query?location(Bob, hospital), and a principalp1 returns a proof that consists
of a rule node produced byp1 and two leaf nodes produced byp2 andp3 respectively. A
principalp0 caches the factlocation(Bob, hospital) derived from the received proof. Since
principalsp1, p2, andp3 contribute to constructing the proof tree, they all should be eligible
to revokep0’s cached fact. Therefore, each principali for i = 1, 2, 3 includes a capability
ci into his produced node so thatpi can revoke the proof later. A principalp0 who caches
the factlocation(Bob, hospital) associates it with the capabilitiesc1, c2, andc3 obtained
from the proof. Since principalp3 chosep0, notp1, as a receiver of his proofpf3, p3 revokes
his proof by sending a capabilityc3 directly to principalp0. Receiving that revocation mes-
sage, a principalp0 removes the cached fact associated with the capabilityc3. Principalsp1
andp2 could revoke the same cached fact in the same way. Our capability-based revocation
does not involve any public-key operations, which are computationally expensive, because
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a revocation message can be directly sent to a principal that maintains a cached fact. When
our system constructs a proof tree responding to an authorization query, public-key en-
cryptions are necessary to prevent intermediate principals between a sender and a receiver
principal from reading the sender’s query result. Furthermore, a revocation message does
not need to be signed by a sender principal, because the capability is known only to the
sender and the receiver of the revocation message. However, our revocation mechanism
does need symmetric-key encryption for transmitting some revocation messages, since a
revocation message contains an additional capability, which must be protected from eaves-
droppers, when we revoke a negative query result, as we discuss in Section5.4.
5.2 Design of a caching and revocation mechanism
Our revocation mechanism is based on a publisher-subscriber model; that is, a querier prin-
cipal subscribes to a handler principal that handles his query, and the handler principal
sends a revocation message when the query result becomes invalid. This process might
occur recursively until all the cached facts that depend on the invalidated fact are revoked
across the network. Figure5.2 shows the structure of our caching and revocation mecha-
nism and the message flow among the components when a cached fact is revoked. Each
server consists of two components (an inference engine and a revocation handler) and four
data structures (a subscribers list, a dependencies list, a subscription list, and a knowledge
base). For brevity, we omit the query handler and query issuer that appear in Figure3.2
from Figure5.2. The inference engine is responsible for constructing a proof and caching
query results obtained from other principals with the knowledge base and the subscription
list. The engine also maintains information on other principals who issue a query to the en-
gine with the subscribers and dependencies list so that the engine can revoke cached results
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Figure 5.2: Structure of a caching and revocation mechanism. We omit the data structures
from the servers ofp0 andp2 for brevity. The number at the beginning of each message
represents the sequence of the entire revocation process. The return value of a message is
shown under a dotted line in the messages 10, 12, and 13.
engine constructs a proof tree for a factf0, which is unified withq0, and issues a subsequent
queryq1 to principalp2, andp2 returns a proof tree whose root node contains the unified
fact f1 and the pair of a query resultTRUE and a capabilityc2. Note that factsf0 and
f1 are identical to queriesq0 andq1 respectively if those queries do not contain any vari-
ables. Principalp1 storesf1 as a fact into its knowledge base and also puts a key-value pair
(c2, f1) into the subscription list (a hash table). Notice that we use the same knowledge base
to store cached results as well as local rules and facts. After constructing a proof tree for
f0, the engine stores the pair(f1, f0), which representsf0’s dependency onf1, and a nested
tuple(f0, (p0, c1)) into the dependencies and subscribers list respectively. The nested tuple
(f0, (p0, c1)) expresses an if-then rule stating that a capabilityc1 must be sent to principal
p0 if fact f0 becomes invalid. The inference engine finishes handling queryq0 b returning
a proof tree whose root node contains factf0 and the pair of a query resultTRUE and a
capabilityc1.
The revocation process occurs when principalp2 sends a revocation message that con-
tains a capabilityc2. Principalp1’s revocation handler receives the message, obtains a fact
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to be revoked with capabilityc2 from the subscription list, and removes factf1 from the
knowledge base. Next, the revocation handler obtains factf0, which depends onf1, from
the dependencies list and then accesses the subscribers list to obtain a capabilityc1 for
revoking principalp0’s cached factf0, and sendsc1 to p0’s revocation handler. The same
process is repeated onp0’s server.
If a capability is a shared secret that is only used once, a capability does not need to be
encrypted as we explain in this section. In Section5.4 below, though, we add support for
caching negative results and in that case we do need an encrypted channel for this message.
5.3 Synchronization mechanism
There is a race condition to be resolved between the inference engine and the revocation
handler, because both modules access the four data structures in Figure5.2. For example,
it is possible that the revocation handler accesses the subscription list with a capabilityc
that revokes a factf before the inference engine writes the subscription information (i.e.,
(c, f)) to that list.
However, we cannot use a coarse mutual exclusion mechanism that allows the thread
of the inference engine to block other threads’ access to the data structure while processing
a query, since a deadlock occurs when the engine issues a remote query that causes a
closed cycle of subsequent queries by remote servers. For example, if a downstream server
that receives a subsequent query issues a remote query back to the server of the inference
engine, a new thread that is created to handle that query blocks because the inference engine
on that server already obtains a lock on the data structures, which the new thread needs to
access. Thus, the inference engine would wait for a reply for the remote query forever.
We, therefore, built a fine-grained synchronization mechanism that ensures that the
engine that receives a proof-tree node with capabilityc updates the data structures before
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the revocation handler that receives a capabilityc accesses them. To achieve this, our
system creates a monitor object per capability and maintains a pair of a capability and a
monitor object in a hash table. Figure5.3 shows the pseudo code for the synchronization
algorithm for the inference engine and the revocation handler. We use a monitor object
in Figure5.3a to block the revocation handler until the inference engine finishes handling
a query. All the methods of this monitor object are an atomic operation, and thus more
than two threads execute a thread concurrently. Since only the inference engine needs to
block the other thread (i.e., the revocation handler), the lock of the monitor is set when it is
created and is released when the inference engine calls therelease method after it finishes
handling the query. ThenotifyAll function in therelease method sends a signal to awaken
all the threads that are waiting on the monitor object. The revocation handler thread that
calls thewait method is blocked until the lock is released.
Since a monitor object must be created dynamically either by the inference engine or the
revocation handler, we need to synchronize access to a global hash table that maintains a set
of monitor objects with a capability as a key. Figure5.3b shows thehandleQuery method
of the inference engine. The method first checks whether there exists a monitor object for a
given capability. If the object does not exist, it creates a new monitor object and puts it into
the hash table. The access to the hash table in thesynchronized block is mutually exclusive
among all the threads; the code inside the synchronized block is an atomic operation on the
hash table. The method then continues to process a query and releases the lock of the
object after handling the query. Figure5.3c shows thehandleRevocation method of the
revocation handler. It also creates a monitor object for a given capability, if necessary.
Then, it calls thewait method to wait for the inference engine to finish handling the query.
If the inference engine has already finished it, thewait method does not block the thread
of the revocation handler.
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Hashtable monitors;
    monitor.release();
}
}     
    }
        monitors.put(c, monitor);
    Monitor  monitor = monitors.get(c);
        monitor = new Monitor();




    Monitor monitor = monitors.get(c);
    if(monitor == NULL) {
        monitor = new Monitor();
        monitors.put(c, monitor);
    }
handleRevocation(long c) {
}
    monitor.wait();
handleQuery(long c) {
    // Handle a query...
    // Handle a revocation...
synchronized (monitors) {
(a) Monitor object                    (b) the handleQuery method of                       (c) the handleRevocation method of 
 
    boolean flag;
}
        flag = true;
    }
        flag = false;
        notifyAll();
    }
        if(flag)
            wait();
    }
class Monitor {
    synchronized release() {
    synchronized wait() {
    synchronized Monitor() {
                                                       the inference engine                                         the revocation handler
Figure 5.3: Synchronization algorithm for the inference engine and the revocation han-
dler. We omit parameters that are not relevant to our synchronization mechanism from
Figure5.3a and b.
5.4 Negative caching
Our system also supports caching negative facts (i.e., facts that are false), because a prin-
cipal cannot return a negative result when he does not find any matched fact for the query
in the local knowledge base; another principal might have a fact that matches with the
query. To make a negative decision locally, a principal must cache a negative result after
the attempt to obtain the queried fact from remote principals fails.
To support negative caching, each principal maintains the same set of data structures
in Figure5.2; that is, each server maintains another knowledge base that stores negative
facts. The semantics of a negative revocation are different from that of positive caching;
that is, when a cached negative fact is revoked, that fact can be cached as a positive fact.
(On the other hand, to revoke a positive fact does not necessary mean that the revoked fact
is no longer true; there might be another proof that derives the fact. Note that if a host that
maintains a positive fact has first-hand knowledge about the validity of that fact without
checking with other hosts, that host could convert the revoked positive fact into a negative
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cached fact.)
When a negative fact is revoked, we must find an entry(c, f) in the negative subscrip-
tion list, wherec is a capability andf is the revoked fact, and move it to the subscription
list for positive cached facts. However, we cannot use the same capabilityc for the entry
in the positive list, because it might cause inconsistency about the subscription information
between the sender and receiver of a revocation message in the case where the revocation
message is lost. For example, suppose that we use the same capability for a switched pos-
itive cached fact. When a principal who sends another principal a revocation message for
a negative cached fact, the sender principal moves the corresponding subscription infor-
mation from the subscribers list of negative facts to that of positive facts. However, if the
receiver principal does not receive the message because of a network failure, the receiver
principal continues to maintain the negative cached fact, which is supposed to be revoked.
When the sender principal later sends a revocation message that revokes the switched pos-
itive cached fact, the receiver principal revokes the negative cached fact instead. Thus, the
inconsistency about the cached information occurs.
Therefore, a revocation message for a negative cached result needs to contain a new
capability to revoke the switched positive cached result. Since the new capability must
be a shared secret between a sender and a receiver of the revocation message, we need to
encrypt the message with a shared key between those two parties. However, to establish a
symmetric secure channel for all the pairs of two principals that participate in our system
requiresn2 symmetric keys, wheren is the number of participating principals. To avoid
this key-management challenge, our system encrypts a revocation message with the same
randomly generated symmetric key that is used to encrypt the proof node that contains the
cached result as we describe in Section4.4; that is, each server records the capabilities in
a received proof with a symmetric key that is used to decrypt that proof. Suppose that the
proof contains a node with a capabilitycn and was encrypted with a symmetric keyK when
68
the server receives it. A server stores a(cn, K) pair in a hash table to handle a revocation
message(cn, (cn, cp)K) wherecn is a capability that revokes a current negative result,cp is
a capability that revokes the switched positive result in the future, andK is the symmetric
key associated withcn. When a server receives this message, it first obtains a symmetric
keyK corresponding to the capabilitycn in the message from the hash table, and decrypts
(cn, cp)K with that key. If the first element of the decrypted tuple is same as the capability in
the first field of the revocation message, the server considers that revocation message valid
and revokes the corresponding fact. We continue to use the keyK if we later revoke the
fact that corresponds to the capabilitycp. In a way, the symmetric keyK is a real capability
and the capabilitycn as an indirect reference toK.
The dependencies list for negative facts maintains dependencies between a fact in a
query and facts that were tried but, being false, were not used to construct a proof for
the query; that is, it might be possible to construct a proof for the query if one of those
facts exists in the positive knowledge base. When a server receives notice of revocation
for a negative cached fact, it tries again to build proofs that were not constructed because
of that negative cached fact. We only use facts in the local knowledge base to construct
those proofs, because issuing remote queries could make latency for revocation signifi-
cantly longer. On the other hand, the latency for processing a query only with a local
knowledge base is negligible compared with that for transmitting data over a network or
performing cryptographic operations as we see in Chapter6.
5.5 Timeliness of cached information
Our system must ensure that all the cached facts meet a given timeliness condition; all the
timestamps associated with cached facts must be within a given interval between the cur-
rent time and a recent past time. To simply keep the latest messages does not guarantee the
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freshness of the cached facts because some hosts might crash or an adversary might inter-
cept revocation messages so a server would make an incorrect decision based on obsolete
cached information.
We, therefore, develop a mechanism that ensures the freshness of cached positive and
negative facts obtained from remote servers. The updater thread on each server periodically
sends each subscriber in a subscribers list a message that updates the timestamp of a cached
fact by sending the capability with a new timestamp. We assume that all the server clocks
are approximately synchronized. Since the server sends the same capability to refresh the
same cached fact repeatedly, the updater thread encrypts the message with the same sym-
metric key that would be used to send a revocation message for revoking that cached fact.
The watcher thread on another server receives that message and updates the timestamp of
the fact in a subscription list. The watcher thread must synchronize with the inference en-
gine using the same synchronization method we describe in Section5.3. If the watcher
thread finds any subscription with an old timestamp (possibly because an adversary inter-





In this chapter, we present the experimental results for our system. Many context-aware
applications, such as an emergency-response system in which responders continuously ac-
cess information on an incident over a period from a few hours to several days, need to keep
track of a user’s privileges continuously. Therefore, our focus is to show that our caching
mechanism significantly improves amortized performance of our system, while ensuring
the freshness of cached information.
We used a 27-node cluster connected with a Gigabit Ethernet. Each node had two
2.8GHz Intel XEONs and 4GB RAM, and ran RedHat Linux 9 and Sun Microsystem’s
Java runtime (v1.5.0-hotspot). Our system had approximately 12,000 lines of Java code,
extending the Prolog engine XProlog [114]. We used the Java Cryptographic Extension
(JCE) framework, which provides RSA [99] and Triple-DES (TDES) [33] cryptographic
operations.
The algorithm of the RSA operations in JCE conforms to the encryption scheme RSAES-
PKCS1-v15 in Public-key Cryptography Standard (PKCS) #1 [93]. We used a 1024-bit
public key whose public exponent is fixed to 65537 in our experiments. PKCS #1 uses
the EME-PKCS1-v15 padding method [93] to encrypt or sign a message. The RSA sign-
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ing operation uses MD5 [98] to compute the hash value of a message. We used Outer-CBC
TDES in EDE mode [33] to perform symmetric key operations. The length of our DES keys
was 192 bits, and the padding operation in TDES operations conforms to RFC 1423 [96].
Note that our system is not particularly optimized for performance and that all the code
(including the cryptography library) is written in Java. Nevertheless, our experimental re-
sults show that our system with the caching mechanism is usable without being turned for
performance. It is possible to improve the performance of our system by using a more
efficient cryptography library such the OpenSSL toolkit [90].
We assume that each principal obtains the public keys of the principals when it de-
fines its integrity policies and establish a session key with each of those principals before
handling queries; that is, the performance cost of PKI is not included in our experiments.
In Section6.1, we present a detailed study about the performance of our system without
our caching mechanism. In Section6.2, we compare the latency for handling a query with
and without our caching mechanism. Finally, in Section6.3, we show the results of the
experiments that measured the latency for revoking a cached fact.
6.1 Analysis of performance overhead
We first analyze the performance overhead of our system without the caching mechanism.
Our first experiment measured the latency of the system with two hosts that did not use
the caching mechanism. One host maintains a rulea0(P ) ← a00(P ), and the other host
maintains a facta00(bob). When the former host receives a query?a0(bob), it issues a
remote query?a00(bob) to the other host.
We measured the wall-clock latency for handling a query and also the latency of each
cryptographic operation in that process. The measurement is iterated one hundred times,
and we report the average and standard deviation of the measurements. Table6.1 shows
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the results. Note that some of the operations in Table6.1 involve multiple cryptographic
operations: The “TDES encryption on a returning proof” in Table6.1involves three TDES
operations for encrypting a proof node, a proof tree, and a proof itself recursively. Sim-
ilarly, the “TDES decryption on a received proof” involves three TDES operations. the
“RSA encryption on DES keys” involves two encryption operations: one is an encryp-
tion of a DES key for a proof node and the other is that for a proof tree. Similarly, RSA
decryption on DES keys involves two decryption operations. Also, note that our current
implementation encodes a proof as a set of Java objects that correspond to the string repre-
sentation of the proof in Section4.1. The size of the Java objects was much larger than that
of the corresponding string. For example, the size of strings for a query and a proof in this
experiment was less than 124 bytes.
As we see in Table6.1, public key operations consumed most of the processing time. On
host0, the “RSA decryption on a DES key” from host1 used 53% of the local processing
time. The “TDES decryption on a proof” also used another 22% of the time. On host1,
the “RSA encryption on DES keys” used 22% of the local processing time, and signing a
proof with a RSA private key used another 17%. These results indicate that our caching
scheme should improve the performance because a successful cache hit avoids all of these
public key operations.
Table6.2 compares the basic cost of each cryptographic operation per operation and
per byte. When we compare per-byte operations, TDES operations were a few orders of
magnitude faster than RSA operations. The TDES operations on a proof was an order of
magnitude faster than that on a query. One possible reason is that the cost for computing
a key schedule in a TDES operation becomes relatively larger portion of the total cost, as
the data to be encrypted or decrypted gets smaller. It is not clear why the TDES encryption
of a query is slightly faster than the TDES decryption of the query. The RSA encryption
with a public key was not significantly faster than RSA encryption with a private key due
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host0 host1
latency std. dev. ratio latency std.dev ratio
Total latency 138.1 10.5 85.2 5.1
Issue remote queries 87.9 5.5 0.0 0.0
Local computation 50.2 6.8 1.00 85.2 5.1 1.00
Read objects from a remote host 0.0 0.0 0.00 41.2 0.7 0.48
TDES decryption on a received query 0.0 0.0 0.00 2.2 0.4 0.03
TDES encryption on a returning proof 0.0 0.0 0.00 10.9 3.1 0.12
TDES decryption on a received proof 10.9 3.1 0.22 0.0 0.0 0.00
TDES encryption on an issued query 1.2 0.9 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.00
RSA decryption on DES keys 26.6 1.2 0.53 0.0 0.0 0.00
RSA encryption on DES keys 0.0 0.0 0.00 18.7 2.0 0.22
Create a RSA signature for a proof 0.0 0.0 0.00 14.4 1.5 0.17
Verify a RSA signatures for a proof 2.2 0.9 0.04 0.0 0.0 0.00
Table 6.1: Average latency for processing a query with two hosts without caching capa-
bility. The latency is measured in milliseconds. Thestd. devcolumns show the standard
deviation of each measurement. Theratio columns show the ratio of the latency of each
primitive operation compared with the total local processing time.
to the inefficient implementation of Java cryptography library (JCE). To initialize a Java
Cipher object that provides a method for performing a public-key operation took much of
the time, and the operation of modulo exponentiation in a public-key operation was indeed
an order of magnitude faster than that in a private-key operation. In RSA encryption on
a DES key, to initialize a Cipher object takes 8.3 milliseconds and modulo exponentiation
takes 1.0 milliseconds. On the other hand, in RSA decryption on a DES key, the latency for
initializing a Cipher object is negligible and modular exponentiation takes 9.3 milliseconds.
An operation for signing a proof is slightly slower than an operation for RSA decryption
because the former involves the computation of the MD5 hash value of a proof.
We next study the performance impact of changing the integrity policies that are sent to
a handler principal along with a query. We compared the latency for handling the query in
the example of the emergency response system in Figure3.12and Figure4.9. In both cases,
a set of principalspi (for i = 1, . . . , 7) handled the same query. However, the query that
principalp1 issued top2 was attached with different integrity policies in those two cases.
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byte length latency latency per byte
TDES encryption on a query 723 1.2 0.0017
TDES decryption on a query 723 2.2 0.003
TDES encryption on a proof 34184 11.3 0.00033
TDES decryption on a proof 34184 11.3 0.00033
RSA encryption on a DES key 128 9.3 0.07
RSA decryption on a DES key 128 13.3 0.1
Create a RSA signature for a proof 128 14.4 0.11
Verify a RSA signatures for a proof 128 2.2 0.017
Table 6.2: Basic costs of cryptographic operations. The latency is measured in millisec-
onds. The first column shows the byte length of data on which an operation is performed.
A single TDES encryption and decryption on a proof involves the encryption of a proof
node, a proof tree, and a proof. The byte lengths of those objects were 6507 bytes, 13579
bytes, and 14098 bytes respectively, and their total length was 34184 bytes.
In Figure3.12, all the principals that issue a query trust a handler principal in terms of the
integrity of a query result. For example, responding to a query from principalp1, principal
p2 returns a proof that contains only a root node. In Figure4.9, however, principalp1 only
trusts the integrity ofp2’s rule that is used to handlep1’s query. Thus, principalp2 returns
a proof that consists of a root node that containsp2’ rule and two leaf fact nodes produced
by principalsp3 andp4 respectively. The other principals’ integrity policies are same as in
Figure3.12.
We measured wall-clock latency for handling a query one hundred times and report the
average of the measurements. We also measured the latency of each primitive operation
on each server as we did in the previous experiment. Table6.3 and Table6.4 show the
results for the cases in Figure3.12and Figure4.9, respectively. The standard deviation of
the total latency in the cases of Figure3.12and Figure4.9was 57.4 and 65.4 milliseconds
respectively.
In this experiment, each principalpi ran on a separate hosti. We also show in Figure6.1
the comparison of the local processing time of each host in these two cases. The total
latency of host0 in Table6.4was 105 milliseconds longer than that in Table6.3, largely due
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to two cryptographic operations performed on host1. One was the RSA decryption on DES
keys. Table6.4 shows that the latency for that operation on host1 was 78.9 milliseconds,
while the corresponding latency in Table6.3 is only 26.6 milliseconds. We see that the
latency for RSA decryption on TDES keys was approximately proportional to the number
of DES keys contained in a proof; that is, host1 in Figure4.9decrypted three TDES keys
in a proof, while host1 in Figure3.12decrypted only one DES key.
The other operation that contributed to the increase of the latency was the decryption
of a received proof with a DES key. The latency for that operation in Table6.4 is 50.5
milliseconds, while the corresponding latency in Table6.3 was 10.1 milliseconds. The
latency increased because the proof in the former case was larger than that in the latter case;
that is the proof in the former case contained three nodes, while the latter only contained a
single root node.
In contrast, the local processing time at host2 in Table6.4 was shorter than that in
Table6.3, because principalp2 in Figure4.9 forwarded the proofs from principalsp3 and
p4 to principalp1 by including them into the proof returned top1 without decrypting those
proofs. Therefore, there was no operation for RSA decryption on DES keys on host2 in
Figure4.9, as we see in Table6.4. Principalp2 did not have to check the digital signatures of
the proofs fromp3 andp4. However, when comparing Table6.4to Table6.3, we see that the
increase of the latency in host1 was larger than the decrease of the latency in host2 a we
see in Figure6.1. A large proof that is transmitted across hosts has an effect of increasing
processing time of a particular host that receives that proof, because the receiving host
needs to check the integrity of the large proof by traversing each node. Therefore, the
imbalance of workload among hosts is likely to increase total latency for processing a
query. The results for hosts3, 4, 5, 6, and7 are almost identical in both cases, since their
operations are same in both cases except for the receiver principals of principalp4’s result.
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host0 host1 host2 host3
latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio
Total latency 950.0 898.2 762.7 85.9
Issue remote queries 901.3 766.4 584.0 0.0
Local computation 48.7 1.00 131.9 1.00 178.7 1.00 85.9 1.00
Read objects from remote hosts 0.0 0.00 41.2 0.31 41.3 0.23 41.3 0.48
TDES decryption on received queries 0.0 0.00 1.2 0.01 1.7 0.01 2.5 0.03
TDES encryption on returning proofs 0.0 0.00 3.5 0.03 3.2 0.02 3.4 0.04
TDES decryption on received proofs 9.6 0.20 10.1 0.08 19.5 0.11 0.0 0.00
TDES encryption on issued queries 1.2 0.02 0.8 0.01 2.1 0.01 0.0 0.00
RSA decryption on DES keys 26.7 0.55 26.6 0.20 53.0 0.30 0.0 0.00
RSA encryption on DES keys 0.0 0.00 18.2 0.14 18.0 0.10 18.9 0.22
Create RSA signatures for proofs 0.0 0.00 14.2 0.11 14.1 0.08 14.7 0.17
Verify RSA signatures for proofs 2.2 0.05 2.2 0.02 4.2 0.02 0.0 0.00
host4 host5 host6 host7
latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio
Total latency 492.2 85.8 221.6 85.3
Issue remote queries 313.8 0.0 88.6 0.0
Local computation 178.4 1.00 85.8 1.00 133.0 1.00 85.3 1.00
Read objects from remote hosts 41.1 0.23 41.4 0.48 41.5 0.31 41.4 0.49
TDES decryption on received queries 1.4 0.01 2.2 0.03 1.6 0.01 2.1 0.02
TDES encryption for returning proofs 3.3 0.02 3.3 0.04 3.7 0.03 3.1 0.04
TDES decryption for received proofs 20.6 0.12 0.0 0.00 10.2 0.08 0.0 0.00
TDES encryption on issued queries 1.9 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.8 0.01 0.0 0.00
RSA decryption on DES keys 53.4 0.30 0.0 0.00 26.3 0.20 0.0 0.00
RSA encryption on DES keys 18.1 0.10 19.2 0.22 18.4 0.14 18.9 0.22
Create RSA signatures for proofs 14.1 0.08 14.7 0.17 14.3 0.11 14.7 0.17
Verify RSA signatures for proofs 4.3 0.02 0.0 0.00 2.1 0.02 0.0 0.00
Table 6.3: Average latency for processing a query in Figure3.12. Every principal who
issues a query trusts a principal that handles that query in terms of the integrity of a fact in
that query.
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host0 host1 host2 host3
latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio
Total latency 1055.0 1003.5 725.2 85.6
Issue remote queries 1006.1 752.2 584.3 0.0
Local computation 48.9 1.00 251.3 1.00 141.0 1.00 85.6 1.00
Read objects from remote hosts 0.0 0.00 40.9 0.16 41.1 0.29 41.1 0.48
TDES decryption on received queries 0.0 0.00 1.6 0.01 2.9 0.02 2.4 0.03
TDES encryption on returning proofs 0.0 0.00 3.4 0.01 17.6 0.12 3.3 0.04
TDES decryption on received proofs 9.7 0.20 50.5 0.20 8.5 0.06 0.0 0.00
TDES encryption on issued queries 1.3 0.03 0.9 0.00 1.9 0.01 0.0 0.00
RSA decryption on DES keys 26.6 0.54 78.9 0.31 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
RSA encryption on DES keys 0.0 0.00 18.0 0.07 26.0 0.18 18.9 0.22
Create RSA signatures for proofs 0.0 0.00 14.2 0.06 15.9 0.11 14.5 0.17
Verify RSA signatures for proofs 2.2 0.04 7.0 0.03 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
host4 host5 host6 host7
latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio latency ratio
Total latency 492.2 85.7 221.1 85.5
Issue remote queries 313.2 0.0 88.8 0.0
Local computation 178.8 1.00 85.7 1.00 132.3 1.00 85.5 1.00
Read objects from remote hosts 41.1 0.23 41.3 0.48 41.3 0.31 41.5 0.49
TDES decryption on received queries 1.6 0.01 2.5 0.03 1.7 0.01 2.2 0.03
TDES encryption for returning proofs 3.3 0.02 3.1 0.04 3.6 0.03 3.0 0.04
TDES decryption for received proofs 20.1 0.11 0.0 0.00 9.8 0.07 0.0 0.00
TDES encryption on issued queries 1.8 0.01 0.0 0.00 0.8 0.01 0.0 0.00
RSA decryption on DES keys 52.3 0.29 0.0 0.00 26.3 0.20 0.0 0.00
RSA encryption on DES keys 18.6 0.10 18.8 0.22 18.7 0.14 18.9 0.22
Create RSA signatures for proofs 14.6 0.08 14.4 0.17 14.3 0.11 14.7 0.17
Verify RSA signatures for proofs 4.1 0.02 0.0 0.00 2.2 0.02 0.0 0.00
Table 6.4: Average latency for processing a query in Figure4.9. Principalp1 who issues a



















Figure 6.1: Comparison of local processing time at each principal in Figure3.12 (basic
case) and Figure4.9(general case).
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6.2 Latency for handling queries
We next measured the latency for handling a query with different-size proof trees to evalu-
ate the scalability of our caching scheme. We performed our experiments with 27 servers
run by different principals; those servers could correspond to 27 different agencies in the
emergency-response system. Our test program generated authorization, confidentiality, and
integrity policies for those principals so that our system constructs a proof tree of a given
size (i.e., the number of nodes in the proof tree) for a given query. Each query takes the
form of ?grant(P, R) whereP is a principal andR is a resource. The body of each rule
takes the form ofa0(c0), . . . , an−1(cn−1) whereai for i = 0 to n− 1 is a predicate symbol
andci for i = 0 to n − 1 is a constant. The size of the domain of predicate symbols is
1,000, and the size of the domain of constants is 20. There are possibly 20,000 different
atoms in authorization policies that our test program generates, and it is, therefore, unlikely
that a cache hit occurs when a query is evaluated for the first time. The generated poli-
cies ensures that every querier principal satisfied the confidentiality policies of a handler
principal to which it issued a query, and the handler principal satisfied the querier princi-
pal’s integrity policies. Those policies are independent of any particular application; that
is, our test program chose the topology of a proof tree randomly. However, we conducted
our experiment up to a proof tree with 50 nodes, which we believe is significantly larger
than that in most applications, and, therefore, our results should provide guidelines about
the worst-case latency of those applications. We prepared the facts and rules to allow ten
different proof trees of each size, and in the experiment a given host issued a sequence of
ten different queries of that size.
Our latency measurements also include the performance overhead for handling revo-
cation messages. While measuring latency for handling queries 100 times, our test driver
program updated all the facts in the knowledge bases dynamically. We assumed the extreme
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case that all the facts in each proof tree are dynamic contextual facts, and updated every fact
20 times per second during the experiments. We believe that this update frequency is much
faster than most context-aware applications need. The test driver updated the knowledge
bases so that half of the queries in our experiments succeeded in constructing a proof tree,
because the average latency could vary significantly, depending on how many of the queries
succeeded in constructing a proof. (The latency for building a proof tree is longer than that
for failing to build the tree, because the inference engine stops constructing a proof tree
when it fails to resolve its current goal.)
Figure 6.2(a) compares query-handling latency under five different conditions; each
data point is an average of 100 runs. In theNo caching, with RSAcase, each server did not
cache any results obtained from other servers and used public-key operations for encrypting
DES keys and signing proof trees.No caching, with TDESis same as the first case, except
that every pair of the principals shared a secret DES key and used it to attach a message
authentication code (MAC) using Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication (HMAC-
MD5) hashing algorithm [12, 65] to authenticate an encrypted proof1. We included this
case to show that to use symmetric key operations instead of public-key operations (assum-
ing that all the pair of the principals share a secret key) does not solve the problem of the
long latency for handling a query. In theWarm cachingcase, every server cached results
from other servers and we used only the latency data after the first round of ten different
queries to compute average latency. In theCold cachingcase, every server cached results
from other servers and all the latency data including that of the initial round of queries were
used to compute average latency. In theLocal processingcase, all the rules and facts were
stored in a single server. Therefore, there was no remote query involved, and no encryption.
The two cases without caching show significantly longer latency than the other three
1A collision attack on MD5 is not possible because a malicious third party does not know a secret key
shared by a sender principal and a receiver principal.
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cases, although using MD5 and TDES operations rather than RSA reduced the latency 15 –
50%. The latency grew longer than 500 ms when a proof tree contained more than ten
nodes. Figure6.2(b) shows the same latency results for the other three cases, omitting the
case of no caching. The latency of the cold caching case was 5 to 20 times longer than that
of the warm caching, because the initial queries require the whole process of constructing
a proof tree as in the case of no caching. The latency of the warm caching case was 2 to
15 times higher than that of the local processing case. The reason for the longer latency
is a cache miss due to a revocation of a positive cached fact. However, the latency of the
warm caching case was 3 to 23 times faster than the cold caching case, and thus we could
improve the performance by prefetching query results in advance.
Although we conducted the experiments in a cluster with low-latency connections, our
implementation to some extent simulates a low-latency network by encoding a proof as
a set of Java objects, which is much larger than the corresponding string representation.
Also, our caching mechanism could improve the performance of the system even more
drastically in a wireless environment with low bandwidth and high data-loss ratio, because
to handle a query with local cache is a common case for a long-running continuous query.
The mechanism in Section5.5refreshes cached information periodically, and thus prevents
making false positive decisions due to a disconnected wireless network.
6.3 Latency for revoking cached facts
We measured the latency for revoking cached facts with another experiment. We used
linear proof trees of various depths to measure the latency between the moment the test
driver sent an event that updated a fact in the knowledge base and the moment that the test
driver received the notification of a revoked cached fact from the root server that handles
queries from the test driver. We conducted the same experiment 100 times and report the
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average of the measurements. Figure6.3shows the latency for revoking cached facts with
four different frequencies for updating the knowledge bases. The results show that the
latency increased linearly as the depth of a proof tree grows. The latency slightly increased
as the period for publishing an event decreased. The system handled 100 events per second
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(b) Three cases without no-caching cases.





















Figure 6.3: Average latency for revoking cached facts. Each curve represents a different




In this chapter, we first cover existing context-sensitive authorization systems that con-
sider context information to make an authorization decision. Those systems provide a rule-
based authorization language that allows a policy maker to refer to context information in
a central server. In Section7.2, we cover distributed authorization systems that fetch in-
formation from remote servers while making an authorization decision. In Section7.3, we
cover trust-management systems that support an authorization language that makes it pos-
sible to express trust relations among principals. In Section7.4, we cover trust negotiation
systems, which are considered to be special cases of the distributed authorization systems
where a client and a server exchange credentials to establish trust. The trust negotiation
systems are similar to our systems in that they provide explicit mechanisms for protecting
confidentiality policies. We clarify that those systems have different objectives and thus
provide different mechanisms. In Section7.5, we cover several variants of two-party se-
cure function evaluation (SFE) that protects a client’s private credentials from a server in a
trust management system. Finally, in Section7.6, we cover systems that support caching
mechanisms for an inference engine.
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7.1 Context-sensitive authorization systems
Although others have developed context-sensitive authorization systems, they all use a
trusted central server that maintains authorization policies and context information. In those
authorization systems, it is implicitly assumed that all the context information providers
trust the central server to protect their information properly. The major difference among
the existing context-sensitive authorization systems is an authorization language they sup-
port. Cerberus [5] uses a first-order logic to express policies and context information. Gen-
eralized RBAC (GRBAC) [30, 31, 32], OASIS [8, 52], and Tripathi’s resource discovery
system [112] adopt role-based access control (RBAC) [103], and use a propositional logic
to define context sensitive roles. Myles’ [88] language is written in XML. Most́efaoui [86]
and Apu [62] represent context information as a decision tree. Masone [82] developed a
role definition language (RDL) based on SQL. We cover each existing context-sensitive
authorization system below.
Cerberus [5] allows principals to define context-sensitive policies based on first-order
logic. It expresses context information with context predicates such as “Location” and
“Temperature”, similar to our approach. Cerberus has a monolithic context infrastructure
that contains current and historical context information, and a single inference engine eval-
uates all the authorization decisions.
Myles [88] provides an XML-based authorization language for defining privacy poli-
cies that protect users’ location information, and those privacy policies could be context-
sensitive. A user registers a validator that maintains the user’s privacy policy into a location
server. When the location server receives a request for accessing the user’s location, the
server asks the user’s validator to make an authorization decision. That validator could
access other validators to obtain information to handle the query from the location server.
They assume that all validators trust with each other in terms of the confidentiality and
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integrity of information.
Users must trust a set of validators that collect context information and make authoriza-
tion decisions. Hulsebosch [57] developed an access-control system that supports context-
sensitive policies. The major objective of their system is to allow users to access a service
anonymously; a user provides his context information instead of his identity to be granted
access to a service. However, their scheme requires a central context broker server that
anonymizes the users’ context information, and users must trust that broker server not to
disclose their identifiable context information. There is no detail about their authorization
language in their paper. They suggest adopting several verification methods that ensure the
accuracy of context information, but no detail is covered in the paper.
Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [30, 31, 32] introduces the environmental role (ERole)
to achieve context-aware authorization. Their approach is based on the concept of Role-
based access-control (RBAC). Constraints on environmental (context) variables can be de-
fined with a Prolog-like logic language. Authorization is based on an ordinary role and an
ERole; in effect, the ERole is an additional condition to be satisfied for an authorization
decision. GRBAC has a central context management service that maintains a snapshot of
current environmental conditions and has a central authorization engine that interacts with
that service. They conducted experiments to measure latency for handling an authorization
query with a policy that contains varying number of environmental roles and studied the
effect of caching the environmental roles’ evaluations. However, each of their measure-
ments only involves a single rule, which is a conjunction of RRoles, maintained in a central
authorization server.
Tripathi [112] presents a secure resource discovery system for pervasive computing.
The major objective of their system is to allow a mobile user to access resources in dif-
ferent domains seamlessly by binding the resource names with the resources dynamically
according to the user’s context. Each resource in an environment is protected based on
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context-sensitive role-based access control scheme. This approach is similar to Coving-
ton’s ERole [30, 32]; contextual conditions are defined as preconditions to be satisfied be-
fore performing a requested operation. There is no detail about the architecture and design
of the system in their paper.
OASIS [8, 52] is an RBAC system that can evaluate contextual conditions at both role-
activation time and access time. The context conditions are expressed as context predicates
in the Horn clauses of role-activation rules. OASIS has a central object-relational database
that stores context predicates and also has a central authorization engine.
Most́efaoui [85] proposes a role-based authorization system that considers context in-
formation. A centralized context engine collects context information from other context
servers. The engine authenticates context servers to obtain only trusted information. How-
ever, there is no detail about the design of the system and security policies. Mostéfaoui [86]
later proposes to express context-sensitive authorization policies with a contextual graph in-
stead of a logical language. The context graph, which is similar to a decision tree, consists
of nodes that represent contextual conditions and edges that specify the order to evaluate
those conditions. Each path from a starting node to a goal node specifies the conditions
that must be satisfied to get a privilege. Their focus is to make policies understandable, and
there is no detail about the design and implementation of a system that supports policies
represented as a contextual graph.
Masone [82] developed a role definition language (RDL) for defining context-sensitive
roles. Unlike other context-sensitive role-based authorization systems that use logical ex-
pressions to specify conditions for a role membership, RDL applies mathematical set no-
tation to define a set of role members. A role definition in RDL is converted into event
handlers that stores context events into a relational database and role membership publish-
ers that publish a list of role members every time the list of members has changed.
KNOW [62] is a user-feedback mechanism for a context-sensitive authorization system.
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KNOW uses Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams (OBDDs) to express context-sensitive
policies. An OBDD has two kinds of nodes: terminal and non-terminal. Non-terminal
nodes represent atomic propositions, which are conditions in authorization policies, and
terminal nodes contain a boolean value TRUE or FALSE. Each path from a root node to a
terminal node that contains a TRUE value specifies a set of propositions to be satisfied to
be granted access. When a user’s request is denied, KNOW traverses the OBDD and finds
a set of propositions that must be turned true. If there are multiple such alternative sets, it
uses cost functions to compare the usefulness to the user. KNOW protects authorization
policies with meta-policies, which corresponds to our confidentiality policies, and avoids
disclosing confidential policies to the user who receives feedback. Since KNOW maintains
all the policies in a central server, KNOW’s approach is not applicable to a distributed proof
system like ours.
In summary, none of the earlier approaches distribute authorization policies and context
information into multiple administrative domains and explicitly handle trust: confidential-
ity and integrity. Also, there is no performance study of the earlier systems except for
Generalized RBAC (GRBAC) [31].
7.2 Distributed authorization systems
In this section, we cover distributed authorization systems in which an authorization server
fetches information from remote servers while making an authorization decision. Those
systems are distributed in the sense that a policy maker can define policies that refer to
information or other policies on remote servers. However, the evaluation process of au-
thorization is centralized: a central server that collects all the necessary information from
remote servers makes the authorization decision.
The International Telecommunication Union-Telecommunication Standardization Sec-
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tor (ITU-T) X.812 [128] defines a general framework for distributed authorization systems
we discuss in this section. X.812 does not specify particular mechanisms for implement-
ing the framework. The framework is designed to support control of access according to
context information (e.g., time of attempted access and the location of a requester) in a de-
centralized environment where multiple security domains are involved. An access-control
system in the architecture consists of an Access Control Decision Function (ADF) and an
Access Control Enforcement Function (AEF). An ADF function makes access control de-
cisions by applying access-control policies, and an AEF function enforces the decisions
made by the ADF. To make an authorization decision, ADF collects from other system
entities Access Control Information (ACI), such as context information and attributes of a
requester and a resource. In the X.812 framework, it is possible that an ADF or an AEF
consists of multiple entities in different security domains. However, the X.812 framework
does not define a trust model to exchange information between those entities.
Shibboleth [106], a project of Internet2 [59] and the Middleware Architecture Com-
mittee for Education (MACE) [79], defines architectures and policy structures that enable
cross-institutional sharing of web resources. In Shibboleth, a service provider makes an au-
thorization decision based on the attributes of a requester. When a service provider receives
a request from a user at another institute, it contacts the identity provider at the origin site
(where the requester resides) and obtains the attributes of the user who made the request.
In Shibboleth, the message formats and protocols between service providers and iden-
tity providers are based on the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [101, 102].
To protect users’ privacy, Shibboleth requires that control of attribute release to service
providers to be available to users as well as administrators. Each user defines attribute re-
lease policies that specify which attributes may be disclosed to which service providers,
and the attribute authority module in the identity provider enforces those policies when at-
tributes of a user is requested by a service provider. Shibboleth also allows a user to access
91
a web resource anonymously through the use of a pseudonymous identifier. Shibboleth
defines a standard set of attributes that are widely used in the institutes of higher education.
Shibboleth does not specify any particular authorization language. Therefore, each service
provider needs to convert attribute assertion messages in SAML to statements in its own
authorization language.
SPADE [89] provides Shibboleth with an authorization system that limits access to
users’ attributes in identity providers. SPADE collaborates with the attribute authority
module in an identity provider to provide a mechanism that retrieves an attribute release
policy (ARP) and makes an access-control decision for the user’s attributes requested by
a service provider. SPADE supports delegation of authority with SPKI/SDSI [36, 97] to
maintain ARPs in a decentralized way; a principal with a senior role in an organization
can delegate authority to define ARPs to junior principals by issuing SPKI delegation cer-
tificates. SPADE combines the ARPs defined by multiple principals in a delegation chain
and derives authorization policies for each attribute of a user. We cover SPKI/SDSI in
Section7.3 in more detail.
Woo [123, 124] proposes a logic-based approach to support authorization in a dis-
tributed environment. Woo defines an authorization language based on a first-order logic
to separate policies from mechanisms that depend on a particular implementation. Woo’s
language is designed to express relationships among users’ privileges. For example, when
we define a policy that allows principalP who possesses a privilege for reading a document
a to read another documentb, the policy could be defined as follows.
read(P, a)⇒ read(P, b)
whereread is a predicate that denotes the read privilege. Their language also supports
predicates that express the state of a system, such as CPU load, and it is, therefore, possible
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to define authorization policies based on a limited set of dynamic attributes. Since Woo’s
language supports rules that derive negative rights as well as positive rights, an autho-
rization engine that evaluate the rules could produce two conflicting decisions:grant and
deny. Woo does not discuss how such a conflict should be resolved. Although Woo claims
that it is possible to manage authorization policies and facts in different administrative do-
mains, there is no detail about mechanism for sharing those policies across the domains.
Woo later developed a distributed authorization system [125] where a central authorization
server makes an authorization decision on behalf of a resource owner. The server collects
all the information that is necessary to make an authorization decision from other servers.
Authorization policies are represented as a generalized access-control list (GACL) where
authorization policies are associated with each field in an access-control list.
Jajodia [60] proposes a mechanism for resolving conflicting decisions in a Prolog-like
logic-based language. They provide a set of built-in predicates to define rules to resolve the
conflicts.
The OASIS eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) 2.0 [129] is an au-
thorization language based on the Extensible Markup Language (XML). XACML enables
a policy maker to define an attribute-based authorization policy: a request from a user
contains the attributes of the requester and the requested resource, and only the policies
whose attributes match the attributes in the request are evaluated to make an authorization
decision. In XACML, it is possible to define additional constraints as boolean conditions
combined with disjunction and conjunction operators; a policy in XACML is equivalent
to a statement in propositional logic. A policy can refer to sub-policies defined by other
servers, and, therefore, the policy can contain nested sub-policies of an arbitrary depth.
Since multiple policies for a given request might derive different authorization decisions,
XACML provides a mechanism for resolving such a conflict using a policy-combining
algorithm.
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XACML also defines a distributed architecture that involves four types of system enti-
ties: a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), a Policy Decision Point (PDP), a Policy Informa-
tion Point (PIP), and a Policy Administration Point (PAP). When a PEP receives a request
from a user, it enforces an authorization decision made by a PDP. When it receives a request
from a PEP, a PDP makes an authorization decision by evaluating applicable policies and
returns a response that contains a granting decision. The PDP obtains authorization poli-
cies and attribute values from PAPs and PIPs respectively. XACML defines the formats of
a request and a response messages between a PEP and a PDP. However, it does not specify
a protocol for transporting messages between the two parties. Furthermore, how a PDP
collects policies and attributes from PIPs and PAPs is outside the scope of the XACML 2.0
specification.
The architecture of XACML is decentralized in the sense that authorization policies are
defined and maintained by different parties and that those policies are enforced at multiple
PEPs. However, for a given request, a single PDP needs to collect the policies and attributes
that are necessary to make an authorization decision. That is, the PDP must retrieve all the
sub-policies that are referred to in the authorization policies for the request. The current
XACML 2.0 specification does not standardize either a mechanism for resolving a policy
reference to the corresponding policy in a remote PAP or a mechanism for delegating the
evaluations of sub-policies to other PDPs. It is up to each implementor whether to support
a mechanism that enables multiple PDPs to evaluate an authorization query in a collabora-
tive way. Sun’s XACML implementation [109] provides a mechanism that enables a PDP
to delegate the evaluation of a sub-policy to another PDP. However, there is no explicit
mechanisms for specifying integrity and confidentiality policies.
Collaboration among system entities in XACML needs a trust model among those en-
tities. However, mechanisms for trust establishment between system entities are outside
the scope of the XACML 2.0 specification and is left open to each implementer. For ex-
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ample, XACML does not provide a way to specify integrity and confidentiality policies
on authorization policies maintained in PAPs, as discussed in Section 9.2 of the XACML
2.0 specification [129]. Lorch [78] reports an experience applying XACML to other dis-
tributed authorization systems, such as Shibboleth [106] and PRIMA [77], and concludes
that XACML’s authorization language is flexible enough to support policies in those sys-
tems.
The Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) [101, 102] is an XML-based frame-
work for exchanging security information between online business partners. SAML defines
XML-based common message formats for security assertions, such as authentication state-
ments, attribute statements, and authorization decision statements. In addition, SAML de-
fines an application-layer protocol for exchanging security assertions and specifies bindings
that detail how the SAML protocols are mapped onto transport protocols such as Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP) 1.1 [07]. However, SAML does not define syntax for
encoding a proof that consists of policies (rules) and attributes (facts) as our system does.
XACML and SAML are complimentary because XACML only defines a request and
response format for a PEP and a PDP and does not specify protocols for obtaining attributes
and policies. SAML could be used to implement a protocol that transports messages be-
tween a PEP and a PDP. Also, a PDP can obtain attribute assertions from PIPs via a protocol
in SAML.
There are several distributed authorization systems based on XACML and SAML.
Cardea [68] is a distributed authorization system that adopts XACML for evaluating an
authorization request and SAML for exchanging security assertions among system enti-
ties. Since the collection of attributes is outside the scope of the XACML specification,
Cardea introduces a SAML PDP that handles a SAML authorization request and constructs
a XACML authorization request, which is passed to an XACML PDP that actually eval-
uates authorization policies. The SAML PDP is responsible for collecting attributes from
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Attribute Authorities via a protocol defined in SAML. Cardea assumes that a SAML PDP
maintains a mapping table between a resource requested in an authorization request and a
set of attributes; that is, an SAML PDP knows which attributes an XACML PDP needs in
order to evaluate a given authorization request, and includes those attributes into the autho-
rization request to the XACML PDP. Since an XACML PDP is not capable of retrieving
attributes that are referred to in its policies, an SAML PDP must know a set of policies that
are applied to a given request in advance and it must include all the necessary attributes
in the XACML authorization request. The XACML PDP in a single host makes an autho-
rization decision with all the necessary policies and attributes. In Cardea, an SAML PDP
relies on an external directory service, such as a Lightweight Directory Access Protocol
(LDAP) [67] server, to locate trusted attribute authorities and trusted XACML PDPs.
Stowe [108] extends Sun’s XACML implementation [109] to support a mechanism for
PDP collaboration. In PDP collaboration, a PDP that receives an authorization query for-
wards that query to multiple external PDPs and makes an authorization decision by combin-
ing the responses from those external PDPs. Each PDP maintains a list of trusted external
PDPs to which it forwards a received query. In Stowe’s scheme, each PDP applies the
same list of trusted PDPs to all different queries. Mazzuca [83] later extends Stowe’s sys-
tem into the eXtensible Distributed Access Control (XDAC) system where multiple PDPs
contribute to an authorization decision. To overcome the incompatibility between SAML
and XACML, syntax for SAML assertions is extended to include XACML attributes and
results. First, a PDP can retrieve a policy from another PDP. Second, a PDP issues an au-
thorization query to other PDPs as in Stowe’s PDP collaboration. Mazzuca discussed the
issue of confidential policies and attributes, which is involved in the collaboration of PDPs.
First, a PDP might want to keep a requested policy from another PDP confidential. Second,
when a PDP issues a query to another PDP, some confidential attributes might be passed
along with the query to the receiving PDP. However, the system does not provide mecha-
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nism for defining and enforcing confidentiality policies on policies and attributes. The trust
model of the XDAC system is same as that of Stowe’s system: each PDP maintains a trust-
store that contains certificates of trusted PDPs. Similarly, each PEP maintains a truststore
of trusted PDPs. The XDAC system caches recent decisions on a PEP’s local memory. The
cached decisions are maintained in a linked list. The PEP specifies the lifetime of each el-
ement and the maximum number of elements in the cache. There is no explicit mechanism
for revoking a cached decision when an attribute that is used to derive the decision changes
its value.
Akenti [111] is an authorization service, which corresponds to a Policy Decision Point
(PDP) in XACML, that supports X.509 [127] identified users. An authorization policy in
Akenti consists of a set of policy certificates issued by multiple authorities in different se-
curity domains, but the Akenti policy engine needs to collect all the relevant certificates to
make an authorization decision for the user and the resource. The engine finds all the nec-
essary certificates by searching in the URLs specified in the policy certificates. In Akenti,
all the policies and attributes of a user or a resource are expressed in XML.
PRIMA [77] is an authorization system in a grid environment where resources are nodes
with computational capability. PRIMA uses X.509 attribute certificates [127] to represent
user privileges. The architecture of PRIMA is similar to those of XACML and ITU-T
X.812 [128]; a policy decision point collects certificates and makes authorization decisions.
In summary, distributed authorization systems provide a mechanism for fetching poli-
cies and other information from remote servers. The architecture of those systems except
for Sun’s XACML [109] are centralized in the sense that there is a single server that collects
all the information for making an authorization decision. Those systems do not provide ex-
plicit mechanism for establishing trust among principals in terms of the confidentiality and
integrity of sharing information.
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7.3 Trust management systems
Trust management systems are distributed authorization systems in which authorization
policies express trust relations among principals. Blaze [19] first introduced the notion of a
trust management system that determines whether a set of credentials satisfy authorization
policies for the given request. In a trust management system, the process of authentica-
tion is integrated with that of authorization, and there is no clear distinction between those
processes. When a trust management system converts credentials issued by remote princi-
pals to statements in its authorization language, those statements are explicitly associated
with the issuers of those credentials in the authorization language of the trust management
system. For example, in PolicyMaker [19, 20] and KeyNote [18], a policy consists of a
statement and the public key of a principal that issues that statement. Trust management
systems based on logic [3, 6, 34, 61, 74] introduce the modal operator,says, to specify the
issuer of a statement. Others also provide some language constructs to represent the issuer
of a statement explicitly.
The earlier trust management systems [3, 19, 36, 74] only provide the functionality
for evaluating an authorization query, assuming that all the necessary credentials issued
by remote principals are collected in a single server and are converted into statements in
their authorization languages. Subsequent trust management systems incorporate those
functionalities into their systems. KeyNote [18] performs the verification and conversion of
credentials. Bauer’s distributed proving system [9], Binder [34], REFEREE [29], SD3 [61],
and the Trust Policy Language (TPL) support a mechanism for fetching credentials from
remote servers while processing authorization policies. We first cover the trust management
systems originally proposed by Blaze [19]. Next, we cover systems whose focus is to
support the delegation of authority. Finally, we describe the most general trust management
systems whose policies are based on logic.
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PolicyMaker [19, 20] is a trust management system that determines whether a particular
set of credentials satisfy authorization policies. PolicyMaker eliminates the boundary be-
tween an authentication process and an authorization process; PolicyMaker does not have
a separate authentication process that verifies the identity of a requester. The core of the
PolicyMaker trust management system is a function that takes as inputs a request, a set
of local policies, and a set of credentials and that returns a boolean decision (yes or no),
depending on whether the credentials constitute a proof that the request complies with the
policies. Therefore, this functionality is calledcompliance checking. The enforcement of
an authorization decision is left open to each application that issues the authorization query;
PolicyMaker just provides an application with an answer for the authorization query.
PolicyMaker expresses both policies and credentials as an assertion that consists of a
set of predicates, and one or more public keys. The predicates check the attributes of a
request and an environment (including information about the current context). If a source
principal that issues an assertion holds authority for the compliance checking of a request,
that assertion is applied to the request to obtain principals to which the authority is dele-
gated; that is, if the predicates in the assertion are evaluated to be true, the authority for
compliance checking is delegated to the set of principals in the assertion. In PolicyMaker,
any language that can be safely interpreted can be used as a language for implementing
predicates. For example, a variant of AWK without file I/O operations and with program
execution time limits is provided as a sample language. Initially, a local principal that han-
dles a request has the authority for compliance checking and, therefore, a local policy is
applied to the request first. Once the authority is delegated to other principals, credentials
signed by those principals can be applied to the request in the same way. This process is
iterated until the principal that issues the request gains the authority for the request or until
the function exhausts all applicable assertions. Thus, the problem of compliance checking
is to find a sequence of assertions that derive a requesting principal as the authority for
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claiming the statement in the request.
Blaze [20] shows that compliance checking in the general case is undecidable, and Pol-
icyMaker, therefore, only supports a special case that does not support negative credentials.
PolicyMaker also assumes that the time complexity of each local function associated with
a policy or a credential is bounded. The algorithm for the special case runs in polynomial
time. The collection and verification of credentials is outside the scope of PolicyMaker;
that is, an application that issues a query to PolicyMaker is responsible for collecting cre-
dentials and checking cryptographic digital signatures.
KeyNote [16, 17, 18] is a descendant of PolicyMaker. In addition to the original goals
of PolicyMaker, KeyNote aims to standardize a language syntax for policies and creden-
tials and to ease the integration of the trust management engine into applications. KeyNote
requires that policies and credentials are written in a specific language so that they can be
handled smoothly with KeyNote’s compliance checker. KeyNote is responsible for check-
ing cryptographic digital signatures. However, it does not automatically fetch credentials
from remote hosts.
REFEREE [29] is a trust management system for web applications. REFEREE provides
both a general policy-evaluation mechanism and a language for specifying trust policies.
Referee’s policies, which are represented as s-expressions, specify conditions on attributes
of credentials fetched from remote hosts. Referee’s engine provides mechanisms for fetch-
ing and verifying credentials from remote hosts.
Herberg [50] developed a Trust Policy Language (TPL) that maps public keys of prin-
cipals to business roles, based on certificates issued by third parties. A role in TPL is a
group of entities that represent a specific organization unit. TPL is written in XML, and
the expressiveness of TPL is equivalent to a logic-based language, such as Prolog. TPL
is designed to simplify the syntax of a policy that needs multiple parties to sign the same
statement about the attributes of a user. There are two major differences from prior trust
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management systems such as PolicyMaker [19], KeyNote [18], and REFEREE [29]. First,
TPL supports negative certificates as well as positive certificates. It is, however, necessary
for a policy maker to define where the policy engine searches for negative certificates. Sec-
ond, the TPL policy engine provides a mechanism for collecting missing certificates from
remote hosts. The TRL policy engine is a single point that collects all the policies and
certificates to assign roles to users.
The Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) [36] defines a standard for authorization
certificates. A SPKI certificate binds either a name or a key to authorization. SPKI defines
an internal representation of certificates as well as its own certificate format in order to han-
dle PGP certificates [92] and X.509 certificates [127]. The SPKI incorporates local names
defined by a Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [97] so that fully qualified
linked names represent globally unique names. SPKI internal representation encodes the
delegation of authorization rights as a 5-tuple that consists of an issuer, a subject, a boolean
flag, authorization, and validity dates. The boolean flag specifies whether the subject is
permitted by the issuer to further propagate the authorization; SPKI does not support in-
teger control to restrict the depth of delegation. The authorization field is represented as
an S-expression (a LISP-like parenthesized expression) that contains a set of primitive per-
missions. An authorization is granted if there is a delegation path from a principal in an
access-control list that protects a resource to a principal that makes a request. Although
there is a general algorithm for finding the delegation path from a set of unordered certifi-
cates in a central repository, the designers of SPKI expect that each principal who is granted
some authority should receive a sequence of certificates delegating that authority and that
the algorithm might be used only rarely.
The attribute-based privilege management infrastructure (PMI) [64] applies X.509 at-
tribute certificates to enable a principal to delegate its privileges to another principal. A
privilege verifier makes an authorization decision by checking whether there is a delega-
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tion chain of certificates from the source of authority, which is trusted by the privilege
verifier with respect to assignments of privileges to principals, to the principal that issues
the request. There is no detail about the mechanism for collecting certificates and checking
the delegation chain.
As part of the Digital Distributed System Security Architecture [39, 40], the logic of
authentication [3, 66, 122] provides a formal way to define authorization policies that con-
sider statements made by different principals in a distributed environment. The logic of
authentication handles only propositional statements that do not contain variables. How-
ever, new operators in modal logic [56] are introduced to express different principals’ belief
in a distributed environment. Those operators makes it possible to define rules that derive
a principal’s belief based on other principals’ belief. For example, we can use the operator
saysto express a principalA’s belief on a statements. The statementA sayss means that
principalA believes that the statements is true. Thespeaks foroperator, which is denoted
as⇒, allows us to define principalA’s belief based on principalB’s belief. The statement
A ⇒ B means that if principalA believes that a statements is true, then principalB also
believess to be true; that is, this statement allows principalB to delegate its authority to
principalA. A request is granted if the system generates a proof that a requesting principalp
speaks for one of principals in the access-control list on the requested resource. Lampson’s
implementation [66] assumes that a server that makes an authorization decision collects
all the certificates to construct a proof. The subsequent logic-based trust management sys-
tems [6, 9, 34, 61, 74] incorporate the modal operators in the logic of authentication into
their logic-based languages using the same or similar syntax. SPKI/SDSI [36, 97] sup-
ports the notion ofspeaks forrelation between two principals, but uses different syntax.
Howell [55] defines the semantics of SPKI based on the logic of authentication.
Aura [7] models delegation certificates as a directed graph, where nodes represent prin-
cipals’ keys and edges represent access rights, and studies an efficient algorithm to find
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a delegation chain for making an authorization decision. Aura’s algorithm combines a
depth-first forward search and a breadth-first backward search to handle threshold certifi-
cates efficiently.
Snowflake [54] is a delegation-based authorization system based on SPKI. Howell [55]
extends Abadi’s logic of authentication [3] to formally define the semantics of SPKI that
includes restricted delegation. Howell’s logic represents restricted delegation asA ⇒T B
whereA and B are principals andT is a set of permissions to be delegated. We read
this statement as “principalA speaks for principalB regarding the statements inT .” In
Snowflake, a client who makes a request is responsible for constructing a proof. When
the client issues the request, a server returns a principal that the client must speak for
and the minimum restriction set that the delegation must allow. The client’s prover object
constructs a proof that derives a statement that a client speaks for the given principal by
traversing search space from that principal.
Proof-carry authorization (PCA) [6] uses higher-order logic, in which we can quantify
formulas, to define authorization policies. The goal of PCA is to prove application-specific
rules, which appears in Abadi’s logic and SPKI, as lemmas proved from a single set of
inference rules. Since higher-order logic in PCA is undecidable, PCA puts the burden of
constructing a proof on a client principal. Bauer [10, 11] later developed a web-based au-
thorization system based on PCA. In Bauer’s system, a client constructs a proof by respond-
ing to a challenge issued from the server. Although the server could hide some confidential
policies from the client, there is no unified mechanism that protects confidential credentials
that the client collects from other servers.
Ranganathan [95] proposes to use a first-order logic to model a user’s context and to
reason about it. To reason with context information stored in multiple hosts, each context
provider on those hosts provides an interface that handles a query from a remote host. How-
ever, their scheme does not provide a way to define confidentiality and integrity policies on
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rules and facts in a knowledge base of each host, and thus does not have any mechanism for
protecting confidential rules and facts, either. Their system does not support any caching
mechanism that stores retrieved facts from remote hosts.
Delegation Logic (DL) [74, 75] is a logic-based language for trust management sys-
tems. The major difference from earlier trust management systems, such as PolicyMaker [19]
and KeyNote [18], is that the semantics of DL is defined based on a well-studied logic
programming language. The monotonic version of DL, called D1LP, is based on Data-
log [113], which does not support negated atoms and functions with non-zero arities. D1LP
extends Datalog by introducing explicit constructs for expressing delegations with integer
depths and complex principal structures such as a k-out-of-n threshold that requires agree-
ment amongk out of n principals. DL supports the constructsaysto express a rule or a
fact stated by a remote principal, and this construct allows a policy maker to express trust
on a remote principal’s statement. Since DL provides a language construct for expressing
trust in the integrity of a statement, it is possible to define a rule that refers to a principal’s
attribute to decide whether the principal’s statement is trustworthy. On the other hand, our
scheme does not have this flexibility, because our integrity policy is a list of principals.
DL uses the constructdelegatesto express the delegation of authority; for example,
Bob delegatesaccess(docZ)∧1 to David.
The above rule states that Bob delegates the authority to accessdocZ to David, and the
depth of the delegation is 1, which means that Bob does not trust people that Dave trusts.
Ninghui [75] shows that there exists a function that converts a DL program into the equiv-
alent Datalog program by introducing the predicatesholds anddelegates. The function is
computable in polynomial time with respect to the size of the program and the maximum
delegation depth. Since Datalog is computationally tractable, DL is proved to be tractable
104
as well.
An authorization engine that supports DL needs to collect all the credentials that are
necessary to make an authorization decision and translate those credentials into rules in
DL. DL does not provide a mechanism for retrieving credentials from remote servers while
evaluating the request. Li [72] also defines a nonmonotonic version of DL, called D2LP,
that supports negative facts, and reports that it is difficult to support nonmonotonic policies
because complete information is inherently hard to obtain in a distributed environment.
Ninghui [76] later developed the Role-based Trust-management language (RT) that sup-
ports role-based access control (RBAC) [103] policies. RT provides a language syntax that
allows each principal to define a local role and to delegate authority to another principal
by including the remote principal’s role in the local role. RT also provides language con-
structs for defining parameterized roles [42] and separation of duty (SoD). SoD policies
define mutually exclusive roles that a principal cannot hold at the same time. However,
it is difficult to collect complete information in a distributed environment. RT, therefore,
changes the semantics of SoD so that the policy does not involve negative statements; that
is, if there is a task that involves multiple roles, RT provides a language construct that en-
sures that each role is hold by a different principal. The semantics of RT is defined with a
transformation function from RT to Datalog.
SD3 [61] is a logic-based language for a trust management system. SD3 is an extension
of Datalog [113], which stands for Secure Dynamically Distributed Datalog. SD3 extends
Datalog with SDSI linked local names [2, 97], which are local names paired with public
keys. The expressionK$E whereK is a key andE is a statement means that a key holder
of K says the statementE. The inference engine of SD3 constructs a proof tree for a given
query so that the querier can verify the correctness of the query result. Its focus is to retrieve
certificates (that correspond to facts in a knowledge base) from remote hosts automatically,
and the whole proof tree is constructed on a central server. Therefore, SD3 requires all the
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remote hosts that provide certificates to trust the central server with the inference engine
to preserve the confidentiality policies of their facts, as in the authorization systems in
Section7.1. SD3 does not support the transmission of rules in certificates.
Binder [34] is a logic-based authorization language that extends Datalog [113] with a
modal operatorsays. In Binder, inference engines on different servers can exchange state-
ments (facts or rules) as signed certificates. When a statement is imported into an inference
engine, that statement is automatically quoted with thesaysoperator to differentiate it with
local statements. Thesaysoperator can be used to specify trust in the integrity of a fact
maintained in a remote server. For example, the following statement expresses the trust in
an authority at Dartmouth College that possesses the public keyrsa:3:clebad8dto say who
is a Dartmouth student.
student(P, Dartmouth) :- rsa:3:clebad8dsaysstudent(P, Dartmouth).
This statement corresponds to our integrity policy on a fact. However, Binder does not
provide a way to define trust on a rule, and thus does not have the notion of integrity for a
proof that consists of rules and facts. Although Binder allows multiple servers to exchange
certificates that contain rules and facts, it does not have a mechanism for decomposing a
proof; that is, a server that issues a query collects all the facts and rules for deriving the
query result. Binder provides no mechanism for protecting confidential rules and facts.
Bauer [9] developed a distributed proving system that constructs a proof that grants
access to a resource; a principal that constructs a proof could delegate a task of building a
sub-proof to another principal rather than collecting all the certificates that are necessary to
construct a whole proof. Bauer’s authorization language is based on the logic of authenti-
cation [3], and provides the modal operators such ass ysandspeaksfor. Bauer’s scheme is
similar to ours in the sense that a proof is produced by multiple principals in a distributed
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environment. However, their algorithm does not address the issue of protecting confidential
information in certificates, which are used to construct a proof. Like Binder [34], Bauer’s
language uses a constructsays, to express trust in the integrity of a fact in a remote server.
However, even if a principal that issues a query trusts the integrity of a principal that han-
dles that query in terms of the integrity of the query result, the handler principal still returns
a proof that contains multiple certificates and thus a whole proof for an initial query is con-
structed on the host of a principal that issues an initial query. There is no mechanism for
proof decomposition like ours. Although their system caches both positive and negative
facts, it does not support mechanisms for revoking cached information.
The idea of delegating the evaluation of a proof to a trusted server also appears in some
protocols used to verify a certificate in a public-key infrastructure. To verify a certificate,
one must construct a certificate chain from the certificate authority (CA) that issued the
certificate to a CA that is trusted by a querier. The Simple Certificate Validation Protocol
(SCVP) [81] allows a client with limited processing and communication capabilities to ask
a trusted server about the validity of a certificate. The client can specify a list of trusted
CAs in its validation policy to be observed by the server. The client can ask the server to
provide additional information, such as a certification path and corresponding revocation
status, depending on the trustworthiness of the server. Although it is similar to our work
in the sense that the protocol uses the client’s trust in the server to split the overhead of
verifying a certificate between them, it is specialized in handling certificate chains, and
it does not support general rules. In addition, there is no mechanism that addresses the
confidentiality of rules or facts, because cross certificates (trust relations) among CAs are
considered to be public knowledge.
PeerAccess [121] is a framework for reasoning about authorization in a distributed en-
vironment. PeerAccess consists of a set of peers that maintain a local knowledge base.
Each peer makes an authorization decision by collecting rules and facts maintained by
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other peers. Each knowledge base also contains release policies that protect the local au-
thorization policies and facts. Release policies in PeerAccess areticky in the sense that
those policies are permanently attached to the information they protect; that is, PeerAccess
assumes that all peers that exchange their rules and facts with each other enforce the orig-
inal publishers’ release policies correctly. Although PeerAccess supports mechanisms that
protect confidential authorization policies, each peer needs to collect all the rules and facts
in a proof to make the authorization decision.
We conclude this section with the summary of the major features of the trust manage-
ment systems, comparing with our system. First, the trust management systems makes an
authorization decisions by considering credentials issued by remote servers. Our system
does that as well because a query result is a logical statement or a proof that is digitally
signed by a remote principal. However, the query result has a more complex structure than
a credential in a trust management system; that is, the query result could be embedded with
other credentials issued by multiple different principals as we describe in Section3.2 a d
Section4.1 respectively. Second, the trust management systems provide an authorization
language that supports logical inference. There are several systems [9, 34, 61, 74] whose
authorization languages are the extension of Datalog. They all except for D2LP [7 ] only
support monotonic reasoning and do not support the negation of statements in their lan-
guage because it is essentially difficult to collect complete information in a distributed en-
vironment. Our authorization language, which is also based on Datalog, does not support
nonmonotonic reasoning, either. Third, in trust management systems, all the statements
converted from credentials are explicitly associated with the issuer of that statement. For
example, the modal operatorsaysin a logic-based language combines a statement with its
issuer. It is possible to implicitly specify the trust in the correctness of a statement obtained
from a remote principal by defining a rule that derives a local statement from a statement
in which a trusted remote principal is quoted. That is, the trust management systems based
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on logic incorporate integrity policies into their authorization language. On the other hand,
our system provides a different way to define integrity policies; that is, our integrity policies
are essentially a mapping table that associates a rule or a fact in authorization policies with
a list of trusted principals. The approach with the modal operator allows a policy maker
to specify integrity policies based on rules. For example, a principalp0 can express an
integrity policy that requires two principalsp1 andp2 to state a same statement as follows.
loc(P, L)← p1 saysloc(P, L) ∧ p2 saysloc(P, L)
In the above policy, a statement of a principal’s location is trusted if principalsp1 andp2
agree on the statement. Our system cannot express such integrity policies that involve in-
ference. However, this approach makes it difficult to share integrity policies with other
principals, because there is no explicit distinction between authorization and integrity poli-
cies in a trust management system. Integrity policies might be tightly coupled with au-
thorization policies that contain confidential information. Therefore, it is difficult for one
principal to delegate the task of constructing a subproof to another principal. Fourth, the
trust management systems evaluate authorization policies in a central server, although their
authorization policies encode trust relations among different principals. Our system does
not have a central server for evaluating an authorization query to protect the participants’
confidential policies.
In summary, the trust management systems are distributed authorization systems whose
policy languages express integrity policies among principals. Existing trust management
systems except for PeerAccess [121] do not provide an explicit mechanism for expressing
confidentiality policies on rules and facts. Although authorization policies in trust man-
agement systems consider trust relations among principals in multiple security domains,
the process of evaluating an authorization query must be performed in a centralized way;
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that is, an authorization decision is made by a central server that collects all the credentials
referred to by the authorization policies.
7.4 Automated trust negotiation systems
An automated trust negotiation (ATN) system [21, 105, 118, 119, 132, 133] is an attribute-
based authorization system whose focus is to protect authorization policies on resources. In
ATN, a requesting client is responsible for providing attribute certificates in order to show
that the client satisfies the authorization policies for accessing the resource. However,
if the server asks the client to submit a set of certificates, the server might disclose its
confidential policies. To solve this problem, an ATN system treats a policy as a resource to
be protected; that is, an authorization policy that protects a resource can be protected with
another policy, and that meta policy is also protected with another policy recursively. When
a server receives a request for a resource, the server must traverse the policies, starting from
the resource, until it finds the outermost policy, which is not protected with any policy. To
make an authorization decision, the server first checks the outermost unprotected policy
by asking the client to provide certificates that are necessary to check that policy. If the
client satisfies that policy, the server checks the policy protected by the outermost policy.
This process continues until the server checks the confidentiality policy that protects the
requested resource. Similarly, an ATN system considers a client’s certificates as a resource
and has the client define a sequence of policies on a certificate in the same way. Therefore,
the process of making an authorization involves iterative disclosures of certificates between
the client and server.
We can consider an ATN system as the special case of our distributed proof system;
there exist only two principals (i.e., a client and a server) who participate in making an
authorization decision. In this setting, if one principal, who receives a query from another
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principal issues a subsequent query, back to the principal that issues the original query,
the former principal reveals information about the rule that is used to handle the original
query. As we discuss in Section8.6, we avoid this inference problem by preventing each
server from issuing a circular subsequent query. We believe this solution is satisfactory
for systems in pervasive computing, because a mobile client, who only carries a portable
device, is unlikely to be involved in the process of making a granting decision. (On the
other hand, ATN systems are primarily intended for web applications [120].) If a server
that receives a client’s request issues a subsequent query to another server, the server does
not disclose its authorization policy to the client. Therefore, we do not introduce policies
that protect confidentiality policies, which corresponds to meta policies in an ATN system.
Ye [131] proposes the collaborative trust negotiation scheme for peer-to-peer systems.
In that scheme, a locally trusted third party (LTTP) breaks cyclic interdependent policies
that are involved in the negotiation process between a client and a server. Every server in a
peer-to-peer system could be a LTTP that caches other server’s credentials obtained through
the process of trust negotiation. Also, each server maintains a list of LTTPs that receive
its credentials; each server maintains a different list of LTTPs, depending on with which
servers it succeeded in a trust negotiation. When two parties fails in a trust negotiation,
they try to find a LTTP trusted by both parties. If there exists such a LTTP, that LTTP
disclose the interdependent policies to each negotiating parties to enable them to continue
their negotiation process. Although, Ye’s scheme involves a trusted third party in a trust
negotiation, credentials, which are involved in the negotiation, belong to either a client or
a server; the negotiation does not require credentials from other servers.
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7.5 Secure function evaluation
Secure function evaluation (SFE) [26, 44, 45, 130] is a technique that enables mutually
untrusted principals to compute a function jointly while hiding their inputs from each other;
that is, there is a general algorithm that computes a functionf(x1, . . . , xn) wherexi is
principalpi’s private input, while ensuring that each principali learns only the output of
the functionf from the computation. The objective of SFE is similar to ours: We want
mutually untrusted principals to compute an authorization decision with each principal’s
private rules and facts as inputs to the function. However, SFE is not directly applicable
to our problem because the algorithm of the functionf to be computed in SFE must be
public knowledge among participating principals before the computation. In our system,
there is no way to know in advance which rules and facts in multiple servers are involved
to make an authorization decision. Nevertheless, in this section, we cover cryptographic
schemes that provide a specialized solution for a two-party SFE problem in order to address
the problem of cyclic policies in automatic trust negotiation systems where a client and a
server possess private attributes and private policies respectively.
Li [ 73] solves the problem of cyclic policies in an ATN system by applying a two-party
secure function evaluation (SFE) [130]. Li assumes that the content of a certificate is public
and that only the fact that a trusted party signs the certificate is sensitive, and formalizes the
problem as follows: Suppose that Alice and Bob have certificatesPA andPB respectively
and that those certificates involve cyclic dependency. LetPA be a pair(MA, ρ) whereMA
andρ are the content and signature of the certificatePA respectively. Alice can discloseMA
to Bob. However, Alice keepsρ private and Bob keepsPB private as well. Alice and Bob
can break the cyclic policies by jointly computing the function that takes as inputsMA, ρ,
andPB. SFE ensures that Alice and Bob do not learn the other party’s private input (i.e.,ρ
or PB) from the computation and that Alice obtains Bob’s certificatePB at the end of the
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computation if Alice uses a valid signatureρ for the computation. Since this computation
involves the verification of the signatures of the attribute certificates, the general technique
of SFE is computationally expensive. Therefore, Li developed a scheme called oblivious
signature-based envelope (OSBE) to solve this problem efficiently. OSBE enables two
parties to share a secret key through a technique similar to that in the Diffie-Hellman key
agreement protocol [35] if Alice possesses the valid signature for her certificate. At the end
of the OSBE protocol, Alice is able to decrypt Bob’s certificate with the jointly computed
secret key.
Holt proposes the scheme of hidden credentials [53] where a client can decrypt a re-
quested resource if the client possesses the right credentials that satisfy the server’s autho-
rization policies. Holt’s scheme makes use of identity-based encryption [22], in which an
arbitrary string can be used as a public key; that is, a server encrypts a resource with a public
key, which is the concatenation of a client’s identity and an attribute, and the client decrypts
it with the private key that corresponds to the credential specified by the server. In Holt’s
scheme, a client can access a resource without disclosing its credentials, and a server can
protect its policies from a client that does not possess a privilege for accessing the resource.
Holt’s scheme supports a policy represented as a boolean formula containing multiple cre-
dentials. A conjunctive policy that requires a client to possess a set of credentials can be
enforced by encrypting a resource recursively with different keys. The disjunctive policy
can be enforced by providing multiple encrypted resources, each of which is encrypted
with a different public key corresponding to a different credential. Holt’s scheme has the
drawback that an authorized client could learn the structure of a policy. Since a public-key
operation in the Holt’s scheme produces ciphertexts longer than the input plain text, it is
possible to infer how manyANDoperators are contained in a policy. Bradshaw [23] adopts
a secret splitting scheme to avoid disclosing information about the structure of a policy to
an unauthorized client. Frikken [38] proposes a scheme for hidden credentials that provide
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stronger security properties. In Frikken’s scheme, a client does not learn anything about a
server’s policies even if the client has a set of credentials that satisfy the servers’ policies.
Oblivious commitment-based envelope (OCBE) [69] is a scheme that enables oblivious
access control. The scheme of OCBE is similar to that of hidden credentials [23, 38, 53] in
that a server sends a client encrypted information that the client can decrypt if attribute cer-
tificates of the client satisfy the server’s policies. OCBE is based the Pedersen commitment
scheme [91], and a client gives a server an attribute certificate that contains the commit-
ment of attribute values. The major difference from the scheme of hidden credentials is
that OCBE supports policies that involve comparison predicates such as≤ and 6=. There-
fore, OCBE allows a server to define a policy that specifies not only an exact value of an
attribute but also an acceptable range of that attribute. OCBE also supports the conjunction
and the disjunction operators to express multiple conditions on the client’s attributes. How-
ever, OCBE requires a server to disclose its policies to a client before starting the OCBE
protocol; it does not protect the servers’ private policies even if the client does not have the
privilege to access the requested resource.
Based on OCBE [69], Li [ 70] developed a scheme called certified input private pol-
icy evaluation (CIPPE) for policy-hiding access control. In CIPPE, a client and a server
compute an authorization decision without disclosing the client’s attributes and the server’s
policies to the other party. CIPPE adopts Yao’s scrambled circuit protocol [80, 130] to
protect a server’s policies from the client. The server constructs a scrambled circuit from
its policy and gives it to the client. The client can obtain the input keys of the circuit, which
are necessary to evaluate the circuit with its inputs, if the client’s knows the attributes val-
ues that correspond to cryptographic commitments [91] shared with the server as in the
scheme of OCBE. With the correct input keys, the client evaluates the scrambled circuit
and obtains the scrambled output, which must be decrypted by the server. The server fi-
nally obtains the decision by decrypting that output received from the client. CIPPE also
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provides a mechanism that makes the topology of a scrambled circuit obscure to avoid
revealing the structure of a policy. Li [71] later proposes a general framework for auto-
matic trust negotiation whose protocol supports cryptographic credentials such as hidden
credentials [23, 38, 53] and OCBE [69].
Hengartner [48, 47] adopts a scheme of hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [41]
to support oblivious access control in pervasive computing where privileges could be de-
fined hierarchically. In pervasive computing, there are many situations where a clients priv-
ilege for accessing fine-grained information allows the client to access coarse information
inferred from the former information. Location information that is defined based on con-
tainment relations is such an example. Hengartner’s scheme allows a certificate holder of
fine-grained information to access a resource protected with a policy that refers to coarser
information obtained from the fine-grained information.
In this section, we introduce cryptographic schemes that protect a client’s confidential
credentials from a server. However, those schemes assume that all the credentials and the
authorization policies are managed by a client and a server respectively. Since our system
must deal with a situation where facts and policies are distributed across multiple parties,
the schemes in this section is not applicable to our problem.
7.6 Caching for an inference engine
There is little published about caching for an inference engine. We conclude this chapter
covering a few logic-based systems that support caching mechanisms.
Katsiri [63] built a prototype of a dual-layer knowledge base based on a first-order logic.
The higher Deductive Abstract layer caches abstract context information derived from low-
level knowledge in the lower layer to make the system scalable. The system consists of a
single server trusted by all and does not support a revocation mechanism in a distributed
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environment.
Wullems [126] developed a role-based authorization system that is similar to OASIS [8,
52]. It has a central server that contains an authorization engine and a context management
service. Context-sensitive policies, which are expressed with a propositional logic, are
used to activate or deactivate a user’s role membership. The server maintains a set of active
roles and reevaluates them when receiving specified triggered context events; that is, the
server caches the privileges of each user as a set of roles. If the role membership status
of a user changes, the server notifies services that make authorization decisions based on
that role membership. However, since the system is centralized, they do not support a





In this chapter, we discuss several design issues, limitations, and security properties of our
system.
8.1 Completeness of our algorithm
The algorithm for the functionGENERATEPROOF in Figure 3.10 and Figure4.6 is not
complete. That is, it is not guaranteed to find a proof that derives a granting decision even
if one exists. This situation could happen when a principal who handles a query is able
to produce multiple alternative proofs. Suppose that the proof that the principal produces
first contains an encrypted subproof obtained from another principal and that encrypted
subproof contains a FALSE value. When the principal returns the proof, a principal who
receives the proof finds that proof invalid after decrypting its embedded subproof. However,
since the principal that returned the proof finished handling the query, that principal is not
able to find another alternative proof.
There are two possible ways to make our algorithm complete. One is to add a mecha-
nism that enables a principal that finishes handling a query to resume processing the same
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query from the previous point of the search space; an inference engine continues to main-
tain various data structures, such as a proof tree, for a query after a proof for that query is
returned, and those data structures must be associated with a unique identifier of the query
to resume the query handling process. This approach does not waste computing and net-
work resources since a proof is constructed on demand. However, it could consume a lot of
memory to maintain these data structures. Furthermore, this approach makes it possible for
a principal that handles a query to infer the query result in an encrypted subproof produced
by another principal; that is, if a querier principal issues a same query again, the handler
principal can infer that the encrypted subproof embedded in the previous proof contains a
FALSEvalue. Considering this security issue, we cannot choose the first approach.
The other is to modify an interface for handling a query so that a principal that handles
a query can return multiple alternative proofs together. A querier principal specifies the
number of proofs he needs as a parameter in a query, and the querier and handler principals
maintain a network session until all the proofs are transmitted. This approach does not have
the security risk of the first approach. However, we need to extend the representation of a
proof in Section4.1to evaluate a set of alternative subproofs as the disjunction of the query
results in those subproofs. This situation happens when a principal that handles a query
issues a subsequent query and obtains multiple alternative proofs together. If the principal
cannot decrypt those proofs, the principal must embed the disjunction of those proofs into
a proof that the principal returns. Although we believe this approach is feasible, it requires
a lot of changes in our current implementation, such as the algorithm for checking the
integrity of a proof, the data structure of a proof object, and so on. Therefore, we plan to
make our algorithm complete in our future work. Although this approach could consume a
lot of computational and network resources to construct multiple proofs for a single query,
to maintain the cached facts derived from the proof is as efficient as with our original
algorithm since it is not necessary to modify our caching and revocation mechanism in
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Chapter5. Thus, the amortized performance in common cases may not be unreasonable.
8.2 Security assurance
Our authorization scheme ensures that each principal’s confidentiality policies are pre-
served while participating in the evaluation of an authorization query. A malicious principal
that represents an internal node of a proof subtree cannot inappropriately obtain a rule or
a fact from other principals by modifying ther ceiverslist in a subquery it issues, be-
cause each principal discloses its rules or facts to other principals only if they satisfy its
confidentiality policies as described in Section4.6.1.
The malicious principal could also modify the integrity policiespoliciesin a subquery
to disturb the evaluation of a query. This attack can be prevented if every principal publishes
its integrity policies with its digital signature on a well-known server, and each principal can
cache other principal’s integrity policies. Thei policiesin a query can then be retrieved by
identifying the principal sending the query, which should also be listed last in thereceivers
list.
We use a nonce to prevent a reply attack by a malicious party that is capable of inter-
cepting and modifying a message. All the participating principals that evaluate an autho-
rization query use the same nonce, generated by the original querying principal, because
the receiver of a proof might be different from a querier principal. The nonce in a proof
must match the nonce in the query, for the proof to be valid.
8.3 Timeliness of authorization decisions
As we see in Chapter6, to process an authorization query involves latency for constructing
a proof, and the authorization decision is thus derived from the proof that might contain
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dynamic facts previously published at different times. Since an authorization decision is
made based on information collected in the past, our system might grant a request that
should have been denied if the current information was available to the system. This lim-
itation in our system might allow a malicious user to gain access to a resource illegally
by changing his context from a legitimate state (that grants his access) to an illegitimate
state before the system detects the change of the the user’s context. Therefore, our system
should provide a policy maker with a way to define explicit timeliness constraints on au-
thorization decisions; that is, a policy maker should be able to specify a timeT such that
all the information in a proof was published within timeT prior to the current time. We
plan to conduct experiments to ensure that our implementation supports a timeT , which is
reasoably small enough for most applications.
8.4 Expressiveness of the authorization language
Our example in Section2.1 represents policies about the current context. Although we do
not treat temporal information specially in our language, our language can express some
policies about historical context by defining predicates that take a timestamp as an argu-
ment. The following is an example policy in a workflow system where an authorization
decision is based on whether a requester has performed a series of actions in a specified
sequence.
grant(P, purchase, X) :- approved(mgr, P, X, t1), approved(senior mgr, P, X, t2), prior(t1, t2)
The above policy requires that a requester needs to obtain an approval from the manager
first, and then from the senior manager. The predicateprior is used to check whether
timestampt1 is prior tot2. For policies that depend on freshness of information, we could
define the predicaterecent that checks the recency of a timestamp using theprior predicate
as follows.
recent(T,X) :- prior(now −X, T ).
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The above rules says that a timestampT is within the durationX from now if T is later
than the timenow - X. We assume that the system define a special dynamic variable “now.”
Our language does not expresseparation of duty[4] in role-based access control
(RBAC) model [103], because to express separation of duty with a logic language (as Jajo-
dia [60] proposes) requires support for rules that contain the negations of atoms. A querier
possibly obtains a false negative in our system due to the constraints of the security policies
of each principal. Therefore, a query that is a negation of an atom causes false positive,
which is not acceptable to any authorization system.
For the same reason, our system does not support a mechanism for detecting or re-
solving conflicting facts. That is, if our system constructs a proof that contains the fact
location(bob, sudikoff ), our system considers that proof as valid even under the presense
of a conflicting fact (e.g.,location(bob,moore)). To reduce such conflicts in facts, we need
a rule that derives the negation of a fact; however, our authorization language does not
support the negation of atoms. Therefore, we cannot define the rule below to detect Bob’s
conflicting location information.
¬location(bob, L1) :- location(bob, L2), L1 6= L2)
Support for negation and confliction detection is future work.
8.5 User feedback
It would be useful, in the case of a FALSE proof, to provide some feedback for the user
about why the proof failed and what policies prevent them from obtaining the desired ac-
cess. Although to return an incomplete proof is a plausible solution, there are two issues
to be addressed. First, due to confidentiality policies the user may not be allowed to re-
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ceive the incomplete proof, and, as a result, the user is not able to know which subproof
failed. Second, because there could be multiple incomplete proofs for a given query, we
need some mechanism that chooses a useful proof for the user from them. The KNOW
system [62], which is a centralized rule-based authorization system, uses a cost function to
rank proofs for a query based on the likeliness that the user is able to satisfy the conditions
in the proofs. It is, however, difficult to define a reasonable cost function in a decentralized
system like ours because there is no single administrator who knows all the rules and se-
curity policies that are involved in authorization decisions. We leave this complex problem
for future work.
8.6 Information leak through inference
In our system, it is possible for a principal who receives a query to issue a subsequent
query to the principal who issues the original query. This opportunity allows the querier
principal to learn the handler principal’s confidential rule. For example, suppose that
a principalp0 issues a query?grant(bob, document) and thatp1, who maintains a rule
grant(P, document) :- employee(P, IBM), issues a query?employee(bob, IBM) to prin-
cipal p0. Then, principalp0 learns thatp1’s granting policy depends on the requester’s
employment, althoughp0 is not sure whether there are any other conditions to be granted
access. One possible solution is to prevent each principal that handles a query from issuing
a query to a principal in the receivers list of that query. We also need to consider this issue
to design the user feedback mechanism we discuss in the previous section.
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Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
This dissertation presents a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive authoriza-
tion. We first summarize our contributions, discuss limitations of and future work for the
system, and finally conclude.
9.1 Contributions
Any context-sensitive authorization system will necessarily be distributed, because context
information and rules will be produced at different places by different parties, and the
confidentiality of those information must be protected in a decentralized way. A large
trusted server, which is adopted by earlier context-sensitive authorization systems, is not
realistic. We take a logic-based approach to address the issue of information sharing across
multiple administrative domains and build a secure distributed proof system for context-
sensitive authorization. Our system enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization
query in a peer-to-peer way, while preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of
mutually untrusted principals running those hosts. The primary contributions of this thesis
are
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• support for fine-grained security policies that formally define trust relations among
principals in terms of information confidentiality and integrity;
• a distributed algorithm that enables multiple principals to construct a proof in a peer-
to-peer way, while preserving the integrity and confidentiality policies of those prin-
cipals;
• a soundness proof of the algorithm;
• the design and implementation of a secure distributed proof system;
• a novel and efficient caching and revocation mechanism that considers the depen-
dency of context information, which is frequently changing, across multiple servers;
and
• a detailed performance study of our system showing that the amortized performance
of our system scales to a large proof that spans across dozens of servers.
9.2 Limitations and future work
We discuss several limitations of our system in Chapter8 and summarize them below.
Our system is not guaranteed to find a proof that satisfies the security policies of each
principal, as we discuss in Section8.1. Therefore, we need to modify the current algorithm
to ensure completeness of our algorithm. We also need to modify our algorithm to prevent
the inference attack described in Section8.6. We need a feedback mechanism in Section8.5
for a user whose request is denied.
There are possible extensions to our current system. First, it is necessary to protect
the confidentiality of a query itself in some situations, because issuing a certain query
might imply the querier’s interest, which he does not want to disclose. We plan to add a
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mechanism for protecting each principals’ queries. Second, our system still fails to con-
struct a proof if our system cannot satisfy all the participants’ security policies. We plan to
improve the possibility of constructing a proof by facilitating information sharing among
mutually untrusted principals with the technique of secure multi-party computation [46]
and anonymization [115, 37]. Third, there are many situations where we have to deal with
context information with varying uncertainty. We, therefore, plan to extend our authoriza-
tion and policy languages to handle probabilistic context information. Fourth, we plan to
apply our distributed proof system to different applications, such as a resource discovery
system for pervasive computing, to generalize the functionality of our system. Finally, we
need understand threats to integrity of raw sensor data in all context-sensitive authorization
systems.
9.3 Conclusions
We present a secure distributed proof system for context-sensitive authorization. Our sys-
tem enables multiple hosts to evaluate an authorization query in a peer-to-peer way, while
preserving the confidentiality and integrity policies of mutually untrusted principals run-
ning those hosts. We show that it is possible to derive an authorization decision, even
though authorization rules and context information referred to by those rules are distributed
across multiple domains and are protected with different confidentiality policies.
We also developed a novel caching and revocation mechanism that improves the per-
formance of our system. Our capability-based revocation mechanism combines an event-
based push mechanism with a query-based pull mechanism where each server recursively
publishes revocation messages over a network by maintaining dependencies among local
and remote cached facts.
Our experimental results show that the performance overhead of public-key operations
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involved in the process of a remote query were large and that our caching mechanism
significantly reduced the amortized latency for handling a query. The results show that our
system should be suitable to a context-aware application in which a user’s privileges must
be continuously monitored. Since our experiments were conducted with a wide range of
parameters, the results serve as guidelines about the worst-case performance of a systems
that adopts our techniques.
Although we describe our system in the context of a logic-based authorization system,
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[26] David Chaum, Claude Crépeau, and Ivan Damgard. Multiparty unconditionally se-
cure protocols. InProceedings of the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory
of computing, pages 11–19, New York, NY, USA, 1988. ACM Press.
[27] Guanling Chen, Ming Li, and David Kotz. Design and implementation of a large-
scale context fusion network. InFirst Annual International Conference on Mobile
and Ubiquitous Systems: Networking and Services (Mobiquitous), pages 246–255,
August 2004.
130
[28] Harry Chen, Tim Finin, and Anupam Joshi. An Ontology for Context-Aware Perva-
sive Computing Environments.Special Issue on Ontologies for Distributed Systems,
Knowledge Engineering Review, 18(3):197–207, May 2004.
[29] Yang-Hua Chu, Joan Feigenbaum, Brian LaMacchia, Paul Resnick, and Martin
Strauss. REFEREE: Trust management for Web applications.Computer Networks
and ISDN Systems, 29(8–13):953–964, 1997.
[30] Michael J. Covington, Mustaque Ahamad, and Srividhya Srinivasan. A security ar-
chitecture for context-aware applications. Technical Report GIT-CC-01-12, Georgia
Institute of Technology, May 2001.
[31] Michael J. Covington, Prahlad Fogla, Zhiyuan Zhan, and Mustaque Ahamad. A
context-aware security architecture for emerging applications. Technical Report
GIT-CC-02-15, Georgia Institute of Technology, February 2002.
[32] Michael J. Covington, Wende Long, Srividhya Srinivasan, Anind K. Dey, Mustaque
Ahamad, and Gregory D. Abowd. Securing context-aware applications using en-
vironment roles. InProceedings of the Sixth ACM Symposium on Access Control
Models and Technologies, pages 10–20. ACM Press, 2001.
[33] Data Encryption Standard (DES), October 1999.http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf .
[34] John DeTreville. Binder, a logic-based security language. InProceedings of the
2002 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, page 105, Washington, DC, USA,
2002. IEEE Computer Society.
[35] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E. Hellman. New directions in cryptography.IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, IT-22(6):644–654, 1976.
131
[36] C. M. Ellison, B. Frantz, B. Lampson, R. Rivest, B. M. Thomas, and T. Ylonen.
SPKI certificate theory. Internet RFC 2693, October 1999.http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc2693.txt .
[37] Michael J. Freedman and Robert Morris. Tarzan: a peer-to-peer anonymizing net-
work layer. InProceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Computer and communi-
cations security, pages 193–206, New York, NY, USA, 2002. ACM Press.
[38] Keith Frikken, Mikhail Atallah, and Jiangtao Li. Hidden access control policies
with hidden credentials. InProceedings of the 2004 ACM workshop on Privacy in
the electronic society, pages 27–27, New York, NY, USA, 2004. ACM Press.
[39] Morrie Gasser, Andy Goldstein, Charlie Kaufman, and Butler Lampson. The digital
distributed system security architecture. InProc. 12th NIST-NCSC National Com-
puter Security Conference, pages 305–319, 1989.
[40] Morrie Gasser and Ellen McDermott. An architecture for practical delegation in a
distributed system. InProceedings of the 1990 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 20–30. IEEE Computer Society, May 1990.
[41] Craig Gentry and Alice Silverberg. Hierarchical ID-based cryptography. InProceed-
ings of the 8th International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptol-
ogy and Information Security, pages 548–566, London, UK, 2002. Springer-Verlag.
[42] Luigi Giuri and Pietro Iglio. Role templates for content-based access control. In
Proceedings of the Second ACM Workshop on Role-based Access Control, pages
153–159. ACM Press, 1997.
[43] Virgil D. Gligor, Shyh-Wei Luan, and Joseph N. Pato. On inter-realm authentication
in large distributed systems.Journal of Computer Security, 2(2–3):137–158, 1993.
132
[44] Oded Goldreich.Foundations of Cryptography Volume 2: Basic Applications. Cam-
bridge University Press, 2004.
[45] Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. How to play any mental game.
In Proceedings of the 19th annual ACM conference on Theory of computing, pages
218–229, New York, NY, USA, 1987. ACM Press.
[46] Shafi Goldwasser. Multi party computations: past and present. InProceedings of
the sixteenth annual ACM symposium on Principles of distributed computing, pages
1–6, New York, NY, USA, 1997. ACM Press.
[47] Urs Hengartner and Peter Steenkiste. Exploiting hierarchical identity-based encryp-
tion for access control to pervasive computing information. Technical Report CMU-
CS-04-172, Carnegie Mellon University, October 2004.
[48] Urs Hengartner and Peter Steenkiste. Exploiting hierarchical identity-based encryp-
tion for access control to pervasive computing information. InProceedings of First
IEEE/CreateNet International Conference on Security and Privacy for Emerging Ar-
eas in Communication Networks (SecureComm), pages 384–393, September 2005.
[49] Karen Henricksen and Jadwiga Indulska. A software engineering framework for
context-aware pervasive computing. InProceedings of the Second IEEE Inter-
national Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom’04),
pages 77–86, Washington, DC, USA, 2004. IEEE Computer Society.
[50] Amir Herzberg, Yosi Mass, Joris Michaeli, Yiftach Ravid, and Dalit Naor. Access
control meets public key infrastructure, or: Assigning roles to strangers. InProceed-
ings of the 2000 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 2–14, Washington,
DC, USA, 2000. IEEE Computer Society.
133
[51] Jeffrey Hightower, Barry Brumitt, and Gaetano Borriello. The Location Stack: A
Layered Model for Location in Ubiquitous Computing. InProceedings of the Fourth
IEEE Workshop on Mobile Computing Systems and Applications, pages 22–28, Cal-
licoon, New York, June 2002. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[52] John A. Hine, Walt Yao, Jean Bacon, and Ken Moody. An architecture for distributed
OASIS services. InIFIP/ACM International Conference on Distributed Systems
Platforms, pages 104–120. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., April 2000.
[53] Jason E. Holt, Robert W. Bradshaw, Kent E. Seamons, and Hilarie Orman. Hidden
credentials. InProceedings of the 2003 ACM workshop on Privacy in the electronic
society, pages 1–8, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[54] Jon Howell and David Kotz. End-to-end authorization. InProceedings of the
2000 Symposium on Operating Systems Design and Implementation, pages 151–
164. USENIX Association, October 2000.
[55] Jon Howell and David Kotz. A formal semantics for SPKI. InProceedings of the
Sixth European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS 2000),
pages 140–158. Springer-Verlag, October 2000.
[56] GE Hughes and MJ Cresswell.A New Introduction to Modal Logic. Routledge,
1996.
[57] R. J. Hulsebosch, A. H. Salden, M. S. Bargh, P. W. G. Ebben, and J. Reitsma. Context
Sensitive Access Control. InProceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Access
Control Models and Technologies, pages 111–119, Baltimore, MD, June 2005.
[58] National incident management system, March 2004.http://www.fema.gov/
pdf/nims/nims_doc_full.pdf .
134
[59] Internet2. http://www.internet2.edu.http://www.internet2.edu .
[60] S. Jajodia, P. Samarati, and V. S. Subrahmanian. A logical language for express-
ing authorizations. InProceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and
Privacy, pages 31–42. IEEE Press, 2001.
[61] Trevor Jim. SD3: A trust management system with certified evaluation. InProceed-
ings of the 2001 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 106–115. IEEE
Computer Society, 2001.
[62] Apu Kapadia, Geetanjali Sampemane, and Roy H. Campbell. KNOW Why your
access was denied: regulating feedback for usable security. InProceedings of the
11th ACM conference on Computer and Communications Security, pages 52–61.
ACM Press, 2004.
[63] Eleftheria Katsiri and Alan Mycroft. Knowledge representation and scalable ab-
stract reasoning for sentient computing using first-order logic. InProceedings of
Challenges and Novel Applications for Automatic Reasoning (CADE-19), pages 73–
87, July 2003.
[64] Scott Knight and Chris Crandy. Scalability issues in pmi delegation. InProceedings
of the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop, pages 77–88. NIST, April 2002.
[65] Hugo Krawczyk, Mihir Bellare, and Ran Canetti. Hmac: Keyed-hashing for message
authentication. Internet RFC 2693, February 1997.http://www-cse.ucsd.
edu/users/mihir/papers/rfc2104.txt .
[66] Butler Lampson, Martı́n Abadi, Michael Burrows, and Edward Wobber. Authenti-
cation in distributed systems: theory and practice.ACM Transactions on Computer
Systems, 10(4):265–310, 1992.
135
[67] Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (v3), December 1997.http://www.
ietf.org/rfc/rfc2251.txt .
[68] Rebekah Lepro. Cardea: Dynamic access control in distributed systems. Technical
Report NAS-03-020, NASA Ames Research Center, November 2003.
[69] Jiangtao Li and Ninghui Li. Oacerts: Oblivious attribute certificates. InProceedings
of 3rd Conference on Applied Cryptography and Network Security, pages 301–317.
Springer, June 2005.
[70] Jiangtao Li and Ninghui Li. Policy-hiding access control in open environment. In
Proceedings of the twenty-fourth annual ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS symposium on Prin-
ciples of distributed computing, pages 29–38, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM
Press.
[71] Jiangtao Li, Ninghui Li, and William H. Winsborough. Automated trust negotiation
using cryptographic credentials. InProceedings of the 12th ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, pages 46–57, New York, NY, USA, 2005.
ACM Press.
[72] Ninghui Li. Delegation Logic: A Logic-based Approach to Distributed Authoriza-
tion. PhD thesis, New York University, September 2000.
[73] Ninghui Li, Wenliang Du, and Dan Boneh. Oblivious signature-based envelope.
In Proceedings of the twenty-second annual symposium on Principles of distributed
computing, pages 182–189, New York, NY, USA, 2003. ACM Press.
[74] Ninghui Li, Joan Feigenbaum, and Benjamin N. Grosof. A logic-based knowledge
representation for authorization with delegation. InProceedings of the 1999 IEEE
136
Computer Security Foundations Workshop, page 162, Washington, DC, USA, 1999.
IEEE Computer Society.
[75] Ninghui Li, Benjamin N. Grosof, and Joan Feigenbaum. Delegation logic: A logic-
based approach to distributed authorization.ACM Transactions on Information and
System Security, 6(1):128–171, 2003.
[76] Ninghui Li, John C. Mitchell, and William H. Winsborough. Design of a role-
based trust-management framework. InProceedings of the 2002 IEEE Symposium
on Security and Privacy, page 114, Washington, DC, USA, 2002. IEEE Computer
Society.
[77] M. Lorch, D. B. Adams, D. Kafura, M. S. R. Koneni, A. Rathi, and S. Shah. The
prima system for privilege management, authorization and enforcement in grid envi-
ronments. InProceedings of the Fourth International Workshop on Grid Computing,
page 109, Washington, DC, USA, 2003. IEEE Computer Society.
[78] Markus Lorch, Seth Proctor, Rebekah Lepro, Dennis Kafura, and Sumit Shah. First
experiences using xacml for access control in distributed systems. InProceedings
of the 2003 ACM workshop on XML security, pages 25–37, New York, NY, USA,
2003. ACM Press.
[79] MACE Middleware Architecture Committee for Education. http://
middleware.internet2.edu/MACE/ .
[80] Dahlia Malkhi, Noam Nisan, Benny Pinkas, and Yaron Sella. Fairplay — a secure
two-party computation system. InProceedings of the 13th Usenix Security Sympo-
sium, pages 287–302, August 2004.
137
[81] A. Malpani, R. Housley, and T. Freeman. Simple certificate valida-
tion protocol (SCVP). Internet Draft, draft-ietf-pkix-scvp-14.txt, April
2004. http://www.oasis-open.org/committees/download.php/
2406/oasis-xamcl-1.0.pdf .
[82] Christopher P. Masone. Role Definition Language (RDL): A Language to Describe
Context-Aware Roles. Technical Report TR2002-426, Dartmouth College, Com-
puter Science, Hanover, NH, May 2002.
[83] Paul J. Mazzuca. Access Control in a Distributed Decentralized Network: An
XML Approach to Network Security using XACML and SAML. Technical Report
TR2004-506, Dartmouth College, Computer Science, Hanover, NH, Spring 2004.
[84] Silvio Micali. NOVOMODO scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI man-
agement. InProceedings of the 1st Annual PKI Research Workshop, pages 15–25,
April 2002.
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